Speeding Up the Crawl to the Top by Abramowicz, Michael
Speeding Up the Crawl to the Top
Michael Abramowiczt
The literature on competition in corporate law has debated
whether competition is a "race to the bottom" or a "race to the top. "
This Article endorses the increasing scholarly consensus that
competition improves corporate law but argues that the pace of
innovation in corporate law is likely to be slow. Because benefits of
corporate law innovation are not internalized, neither states nor firms
will have sufficient incentives to innovate. That competitive federalism
is "to the top" suggests that the model could be applied beyond the
corporate charter context, for example to areas such as bankruptcy,
but that benefits from such competition would accrue only gradually.
This Article concludes by considering several means of stimulating
competition in corporate law, including allowing firms to select
different states for different aspects of corporate law and permitting
private provision of law. Perhaps the most promising of these
possibilities is the use of intellectual property law to protect corporate
law innovations. Although recent decisions allowing patents for
business methods make this approach feasible, the fit with existing
patent law is imperfect. The scarcity in corporate law that leads to
innovation is not a lack of ideas, but a lack offirms and states willing
to accept the risks of being the first to innovate.
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Introduction
The corporate law literature tells a story of progress, slow but sure.
The path of corporate law, the literature promises, is not a "race to the
bottom"' but a "race to the top."'2 And although we may not be at the "top"
yet, we can rest assured that competition will bring us there, at least
someday. Consider, for example, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel's
confident account:
[S]elf-interested entrepreneurs and managers, just like other investors,
are driven to find the devices most likely to maximize net profits. If they
do not, they pay for their mistakes because they receive lower prices for
corporate paper. Any one firm may deviate from the optimal measures.
Over tens of years and thousands of firms, though, tendencies emerge.
I The classic statement of the theory that corporate law is a "race to the bottom" is William
L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666, 705
(1974). In an alternate phrasing that proved to have less staying power, Cary claimed that corporate
law moves "toward the least common denominator." Id. at 663.
2 The rebuttal to Cary, stating the thesis that corporate law is in fact a "race to the top," is




The firms and managers that make the choices investors prefer will
prosper relative to others.
3
In the long run, Easterbrook and Fischel assure us, we will have efficient
corporate law. But "[iun the long run," as Keynes famously warned, "we
are all dead. ' 4
In a commentary in the Harvard Law Review five years ago, Mark
Roe took the first step towards challenging the rhetoric of progress.' By
analogizing corporate evolution to biological evolution,6 Roe undercuts the
standard story.7 The diversity of national regulatory apparatuses for
corporate law suggests that existing forms are a product of "path
dependence"8 and that existing corporate structures may be locally optimal
given the starting point of the path, but not necessarily globally optimal.
Thus, "[t]he United States has strong managers and weak financiers;
Germany and Japan have had stronger financiers." 9 And although there
may be signs of slight convergence,' l avoiding a suboptimal endpoint
might require conscious regulatory action. 1 In the absence of such action,
Roe elaborated in a later article with Lucian Bebchuk, differences in
3 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 6 (1991).
4 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 88 (1923).
5 See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REv. 641
(1996).
6 The process of biological evolution, Roe notes, does not result in a steady improvement
in a species but in long periods of little change followed by a short period of intense struggle and rapid
change. See id. at 646 n.8, 663-65 (citing Stephen Jay Gould, Is a New and General Theory of
Evolution Emerging?, 6 PALEOBIOLOGY 119, 125 (1980) (introducing the theory of punctuated
equilibrium)).
7 In the standard story, states, like firms, compete in a race to the top: "States compete by
producing efficient law. States that fail to provide efficient law get less of the regulated activity.
Inefficient rules are challenged because the challengers find it profitable to do so." Id. at 642.
8 E.g., id. at 643. Along with Lucian Bebchuk, Roe has recently elaborated the sources of
path dependence, arguing that both initial ownership structures and corporate rules can produce path
dependence. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate
Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REv. 127 (1999). Though they note that "players that enjoy
rents under them might have both the incentive and power to impede changes in these [ownership]
structures," id. at 153, they do not explore the problem of underinnovation in corporate law more
generally.
9 Roe, supra note 5, at 647.
10 See id. at 658-59 (discussing changes in the United States and in Germany). Roe
admitted, "I know of no confirming Japanese anecdotes yet." Id. at 658. The recent economic crisis in
Asia, however, may provide them. See David E. Sanger, Greenspan Sees Asian Crisis Moving World
to Western Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1998, at DI.
II See Roe, supra note 5, at 665-66. The possibility of consciously changing the corporate
law environment thus distinguishes corporate evolution from biological evolution. See id. at 665
("Genes are Darwinian, but civilization is Lamarckian."). In this respect, of course, biological
evolution may become more like corporate evolution. See President's Comm'n for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Med. & Biomed. & Behavior Research, Splicing Life: The Social and Ethical Issues of
Genetic Engineering with Human Beings 68-69 (1982) (noting that genetic engineering may enable
humans to control their own evolutionary path), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK IN BIOETHICS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 299, 305-06 (Albert R. Jonsen et al. eds., 1998).
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historical corporate structures and rules may prevent convergence over
long periods of time. 
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Ultimately, though, Roe draws a sharp distinction between
competition among firms within a national system and competition among
national systems, finding the possibility of a suboptimal result only in the
latter. 13 In this Article, I challenge this distinction. Competition among
firms may lead toward a locally optimal endpoint, but this process of
evolution is likely to be as erratic as the broader process of natural
selection among nations.14 The reason is quite simple. Firms do not
compete directly for corporate law structures but for goods and services.
Although corporate law structures will surely impact firms' success in
selling goods and services, they will do so primarily at the margins.1
5
Thus, the incentives that firms have to innovate in corporate law structures
are not as high-powered as those encouraging innovation in goods and
services, and the evolution of corporate structures may proceed as much as
a result of accident as on account of deliberate progress.16
This Article's tasks are both descriptive and normative. Its descriptive
tasks are to explain why the amount of innovation in corporate law is
likely to be suboptimal and to develop a new metaphor for describing the
path of corporate law. The metaphor it urges is that corporate law is a
"crawl to the top,' 17 much as Easterbrook and Fischel's references to "tens
12 See Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 8.
13 See Roe, supra note 5, at 666 ("Competition among business units-the type usually
subject to evolutionary metaphors-best fits a natural selection paradigm. Competition among national
units might better fit a punctuated equilibrium metaphor ....").
14 Indeed Roe might have predicted as much from following through on his analogy to
chaos theory, which predicts that similar patterns will emerge on macro and micro levels of any
dynamic system. See PETER COVENEY & ROGER HIGHFIELD, THE ARROW OF TIME: A VOYAGE
THROUGH SCIENCE TO SOLVE TIME'S GREATEST MYSTERY 204 (1990) (describing the property of
"self-similarity"); JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKrNG A NEW SCIENCE 103 (1988) ("Self-similarity is
symmetry across scale. It implies recursion, pattern inside of pattern."); see also Frank I. Michelman,
Property. Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 301, 349-51 (1993) (discussing chaos in law).
15 Cf Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Control and the Theory of the Firm, in ECONOMIC
POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 281, 294-95 (Henry G. Manne ed., 1969)
(noting that management will be less constrained when there is less competition in markets for goods
and services).
16 Indeed, the role of accident emerges in Roe's telling of the standard account of the
evolution of corporate law structures adopted by firms:
The success of the more efficient practice or law allows it to prosper, while its less
efficient competitors wither and die. Entrepreneurs without a clear understanding
of what they are doing can stumble on an efficient practice. They make money and
their firms grow at the expense of firms that failed through bad luck or poor skill
to adopt the efficient practice.
Roe, supra note 5, at 641-42.
17 Although no prior commentators to my knowledge have focused on the speed of
corporate law innovation, Ralph Winter, in the concluding paragraph of a comment on a portion of an
article by Melvin Eisenberg, commented that "the history of state antitakeover statutes may support the
view that the race to the top is a leisurely walk," as "Delaware waited until its principal competitors
had passed such legislation and then enacted a relatively mild statute." Ralph K. Winter, The "Race for
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of years" suggests.' 8 This is both an optimistic and a pessimistic vision,
optimistic because it suggests that corporate law is likely to improve over
time, and pessimistic because it suggests that the rate of improvement will
be quite slow.
Of the Article's normative tasks, one is responsive particularly to the
optimistic vision; and the other, to the pessimistic vision. The optimistic
vision suggests that state competition for corporate law, as well as
competition among firms at a microcosmic level, will lead to more
innovation in corporate law than monopolistic, exclusively federal
regulation. This suggests that transplanting the model of corporate
federalism that has emerged in charter competition onto other areas of
corporate law might be beneficial. The pessimistic vision, however,
suggests that the existence of state competition is not enough to guarantee
an optimal level of innovation. The Article's second normative task, and
its principal contribution, is to consider mechanisms that might spur
additional innovation. Most of this analysis is admittedly fanciful,
providing a thought experiment assessing different possible solutions
while ignoring the near certainty that they would not be adopted. In this
vein, the Article will argue that the creation of an intellectual property
regime for corporate law innovation would provide the best answer to the
problem. This proposal, like the others that I address, is extraordinarily
unlikely to be implemented in the foreseeable future, but it is plausible
under current doctrine that entrepreneurs could adapt the existing patent
law system to achieve much of the benefit of such a proposal.
The Article is structured in four parts, one for each of its descriptive
and normative tasks. Part I explains in detail why diversified shareholders
are likely to benefit from innovations in corporate law structures by some
corporations within their portfolios, and why neither firms nor states can
be expected to provide the optimal amount of innovation. Innovation is
generally desirable because it provides informational benefits and
promotes diversification. The existence of agency problems,19 however,
means that individual firms' owners and managers will resist providing
such innovation, and states' incentives are to give such owners and
managers what they want.
Part II explores four paradigms of corporate law innovation, the "race
to the bottom," the "race to the top," the "race to nowhere in particular,"
and this Article's contribution: the "crawl to the top." This Part examines
the Top" Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526, 1530 (1989).
18 See supra text accompanying note 3.
19 See generally ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (providing a seminal account of the relationship between ownership
and control of corporations); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. 305 (1976) (describing the
existence of agency costs in principal-agent relationships on account of divergence of interests).
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each of the paradigms by considering firms' and states' incentives to
innovate and concludes that only the last one accurately captures the path
of innovation. The analysis in this Part is quite abstract, dealing not with
the empirics of charter competition, but with theory about how
competition among firms and states in any area of corporate law might be
expected to proceed.2° The model of a "crawl to the top" that I develop
anticipates empirical observations, made in papers that are currently in
preliminary drafts, of state law competition. Marcel Kahan and Ehud
Kamar note that no state has systematically attempted to challenge
Delaware's lead in corporate law, and they label state competition a
"myth."' Robert Daimes, meanwhile, observes that firms choosing a state
of incorporation almost always choose either Delaware or their home
22state .2 A consideration of the incentives of states to innovate makes these
results intuitive, though perhaps also making the word "myth" too strong.
Part III begins by comparing the theoretical predictions of Part II with
the actual experience of corporate charter competition. Because such
competition has probably led to more innovation than monopolistic federal
regulation would have produced, it then considers expanding state
competition to other areas. Although other commentators have suggested
the possibility of expanding state competition to securities law, and
although a form of competition exists for exchange regulation, this Article
is the first to imagine extending state competition to bankruptcy.
Part IV asks what regulatory changes might spur faster innovation, in
corporate charter competition or in one of the other possible areas of
competition sketched in Part III. Among possibilities considered are
breaking up individual areas of competition into multiple areas in which
firms could choose different states to regulate them, allowing for private
provision of corporate regulation in some area, imposing caps on the
number of firms in a state to prevent the stasis that may occur when one
state has emerged as a leader, providing for a federal administrative
agency to subsidize innovating firms or states, accomplishing
subsidization through a demand-revealing preferences scheme, and
offering intellectual-property-like protection to innovators. Private
provision of law has more potential than might appear at first glance,
because only one state would need to act to make such a development
possible. The last of these possibilities is probably the strongest, however,
both in cohering with existing regulatory schemes and in addressing the
20 Cf Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545,
546 (1984) ("Corporate governance is not coextensive with corporation law-a broader subject.").
21 Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55
STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002).
22 Robert Daines, How IPO Firms Choose Corporate Law Rules: Some Evidence on Law,
Lawyers, and the Market for IPO Charters (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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problem. None of these proposals is perfect, however, and certainly none
can be expected to be enacted soon, but they are offered as first sketches of
regulatory regimes that might respond to the problem of underinnovation
in corporate law and speed up the crawl to the top.
I. Underinnovation in Corporate Law
This Part explains why we should expect shareholders to favor
innovation in corporate law and why we should not expect either firms or'
incorporating states to give it to them. First, however, we must make clear
of which shareholders we are speaking, and what it is that we seek to
maximize for them. The assumption of this Section is that the relevant
shareholders are fairly well diversified across a wide variety of public
companies, investing either directly in those companies or through mutual
funds.23 Such investors are assumed to be risk-averse, but this risk aversion
applies to their stock portfolios as a whole, not solely to individual
companies within these portfolios. The ideal amount of innovation is the
level that would maximize these shareholders' utility, taking into account
both the expected value of shareholders' portfolios in the future and the
variance in expected values.
Focusing on well-diversified investors achieves a compromise
between two visions of what goal corporate law shall seek.24 On the one
hand, corporate law scholarship traditionally embraces the goal of
maximization of shareholder wealth with respect to particular companies.
A corporation must do, in this view, that which will maximize the present
discounted value of its profits. On the other hand, the maximand of law-
and-economics scholarship generally is social welfare and thus answers to
corporate law questions must ultimately serve this goal. Of course, those
who seek to maximize shareholder wealth do so because they believe that
this is, at least generally, consistent with social welfare maximization.25
23 For the seminal work on portfolio diversification, see Harry Markowitz, Portfolio
Selection, 8 J. FIN. 77 (1952).
24 For a discussion of the difference between these two views, see Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN.
L. REV. 347, 375 (1991). For useful critiques of the concept of shareholder wealth maximization, see
Henry T.C. Hu, Buffett, Corporate Objectives, and the Nature of Sheep, 19 CARDOzo L. REV. 379,
397-406 (1997), which focuses on the uncertain connection between share values and inherent firm
value, and Joseph Biancalana, Defining the Proper Corporate Constituency: Asking the Wrong
Question, 59 U. IN. L. REV. 425, 461 (1990), which notes that the concept of maximization of
shareholder wealth becomes problematic in the takeover context, where bidders and targets both have
shareholders.
25 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 38 (noting that "maximizing profits
for equity investors assists the other 'constituencies' automatically"). Of course, society may wish to
impose fines on corporations for engaging in certain activities, but as long as such fines are optimally
set, the maximization by corporations of their own wealth will generally maximize social wealth as
well. See, e.g., id. at 37-39.
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The first question of corporate law thus must be the level of
generality at which analysis should proceed: at the level of wealth
maximization for particular corporations or at the level of social welfare.
Corporate law scholarship has settled on the former 26 because of a more-
or-less reasonable assumption that it is a good proxy for the latter27 and
because analysis of shareholder wealth maximization is more tractable
than analysis of social welfare.28 Of course, the equation of shareholder
wealth with social welfare cannot be an unquestioned truism, because
there are other groups besides shareholders-for example, labor and
consumers-who benefit from shareholder wealth maximization only
indirectly. 29 In this Article, however, I am not particularly interested in this
aspect of the possible divergence between the shareholder wealth
maximization and social utility views.
This Article aims instead at another source of divergence,
occasionally remarked upon but rarely affecting analysis of what the
optimal legal structure is for creating corporate law. This source of
divergence is the difference between a shareholder as an owner of a
particular company and a shareholder as an owner of a portfolio of
different companies. That is, an investor with all her eggs in one basket
may have different interests from an investor with eggs in a variety of
baskets, even if that investor is not also a manager of the company. The
difference has been noted most prominently in analysis of conglomerate
acquisitions.30 There is little reason, the logic goes, for corporations to
26 See Henry T.C. Flu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial
Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1282-83 (1991) ("Most
academics now believe that shareholder wealth maximization is the basic pecuniary objective of the
modem publicly held corporation.").
27 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Komhauser, Takeover Defense Tactics: A
Comment on Two Models, 96 YALE L.J. 295, 295 (1986) ("[S]hareholder wealth maximization is seen
as the best available proxy for social wealth maximization.").
28 The problem of conducting social welfare analysis is of course a general one. See Eric
Kades, The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws: The Implications of Computational
Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 403, 481 (1997) ("While there is, at least
according to grand economic theory, some set of policy choices that maximize social welfare (broadly
defined), we would never trust a judge to issue an injunction setting forth every facet of social
policy.").
29 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1549, 1574 n.79 ("True private wealth maximization should, of course, attend to parties to the
corporate contract other than shareholders and managers, such as bondholders and employees."). See
generally Lewis D. Solomon, Symposium: Defining the Corporate Constituency, 59 U. CiN. L. REV.
321 (1990) (considering whether interests of parties other than shareholders should be relevant in
corporate law); Wai Shun Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: A Proposed
Corporate Regime That Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 587
(1997) (explaining how corporate law might take into account interests of parties other than
shareholders).
30 See, e.g., RONALD J. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS
341-60 (1986); Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for
Conglomerate Mergers, 12 BELL J. ECON. 605 (1981); Note, The Conflict Between Managers and
Shareholders in Diversifying Acquisitions: A Portfolio Theory Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 1238 (1974).
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reduce risk through such acquisitions when shareholders can diversify risk
much more cheaply by holding a balanced portfolio.31 Yet in the context of
determining how corporate law should be constructed, as opposed to what
individual corporations should do, analysts have not applied this insight.
This Section seeks to remedy this deficiency by focusing on the
interests of well-diversified shareholders. It does not evaluate social
welfare directly because the analysis, which would then need to take into
account groups other than shareholders, would be quite difficult. Because
most investors are weli-diversified, however, analysis seeking to maximize
their wealth is likely to come closer to maximizing social welfare than the
customary shareholder maximization approach that does not consider
shareholders' portfolio diversification.
A. Why Innovation Is Good for Shareholders
An investor in a number of different companies would generally
prefer some innovation in corporate law to no innovation for two different
reasons: informational externalities, under which I include both learning
and network effects, and portfolio diversification. I will consider these
reasons, the first of which I estimate to be by far the more important, in
turn. First, however, I should explain what I mean by "innovation in
corporate law." An innovation is a change in the structure of a corporation
or in the legal rules governing the corporation's affairs or its interactions
with other corporations, so that the corporation operates or is constrained
in a way different from other corporations.32 If there were no innovation,
all corporations would have exactly the same structure and face the same
legal rules. Thus, my definition of "innovation" is not so broad as to
encompass innovation in the goods or services that a firm produces and
sells to its customers. Patent law, after all, provides firms with incentives
to innovate in that area; and even if it is imperfect, the problem is better
dealt with there than by corporate law scholars.33 My definition, however,
is broader than some might expect, because I include not just classic
decisions of governance-such as how many directors to have on a
board 34-but also any legal rules affecting the corporation's operations.
31 "[C]orporate diversification is generally not beneficial for well-diversified shareholders.
Shareholders do not need corporations to diversify for them. They can easily obtain diversification
themselves simply by purchasing shares of different corporations or the shares of a diversified mutual
fund." Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L.
REv. 277, 324 (1990).
32 "Innovation" is generally defined as "[tihe act of introducing something new."
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 931 (3d ed. 1992).
33 Scholarship addressing imperfections in patent law's attempt to protect innovation
includes Douglas Gary Lichtman, The Economics of Innovation: Protecting Unpatentable Goods, 81
MrNN. L. REv. 693 (1997).
34 See, e.g., Dennis J. Block et al., Proxy Contests and Institutional Investors, 704
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Thus, while I will sometimes refer to "governance structures" as a
convenient shorthand for the area in which investors will seek innovation,
my analysis applies to corporate law writ large, a point I will elaborate
later.
1. Informational Externalities
Adoption of a new governance structure by one company or a group
of companies will provide information to other companies that do not
initially adopt the innovation. Because the innovator does not capture these
informational benefits, the amount of innovation will be suboptimal from
the perspective of the fairly well-diversified investor. An investor holding
stock in just one company might prefer to free-ride off the experiments of
others. But a well-diversified stockholder could benefit considerably if one
or two companies in his [or her] portfolio innovated. If the adoption of an
innovation by one company proved efficient, then other companies could
copy that innovation. For an investor with an interest in an S&P 500 index
fund,35 for example, the risk of any one company's innovation may be
negligible, but the benefits to the other companies in the fund will be
considerable.
The informational benefit externality will generally be a "learning
externality," but could also be a "network externality."36 An innovation
will entail a "learning externality" when other firms benefit from the
innovation when they decide whether to innovate in the future.37 An
PLI/CORP. 161, 287 (1990) (discussing the question of optiml board size).
35 Cf Upinder Dhillon & Herb Johnson, Changes in the Standard and Poor's 500 List, 64 J.
Bus. 75 (1991) (providing empirical evidence that index funds are sound investment vehicles).
36 For a useful discussion of network and learning externalities in the context of corporate
contracts, see Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L.
REv. 757, 774-89 (1995). Other works on network and learning externalities include W. Brian Arthur,
Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116
(1989); William E. Cohen, Competition and Foreclosure in the Context of Installed Base and
Compatibility Effects, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 535 (1996); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base
and Compatibility: Innovation, Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 940
(1986); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J.
ECON. 70 (1985); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro; Product
Compatibility Choice ii a Market with Technological Progress, 38 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 146
(1986); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP.
93 (1994); Paul Klemperer, The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs, 18 RAND J. ECON.
138 (1987); and S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy,
8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133 (1994).
37 This definition of "learning externality" is somewhat broader than Klausner's, who
focuses not on the decision whether to adopt a practice but on the informational advantages from the
first user's experience that flow to those who will decide in the future to adopt a practice. See
Klausner, supra note 36, at 786. Of course, a first user's experience may also produce benefits for
those who decide in the future not to adopt a practice on the basis of that experience. Indeed, this might
explain the disappearance of event risk covenants, which Klausner and Marcel Kahan have examined
in further investigation of network externalities. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
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innovation will entail a "network externality" when other firms
simultaneously making the innovation benefit from a firm's making 
it.38
Such externalities may result in "a competitive equilibrium with a
suboptimal diversity of products" or a market that has "lock[ed] into" a
product and "lock[ed] out socially desirable innovations."39 In the
corporate law context, a firm may not innovate even though such
innovation would be socially desirable because of benefits to other firms.
40
Diversified shareholders may benefit ex ante even from innovations
that they expect to fail. Suppose, for example, that shareholders expect a
certain innovation to lower a firm's discounted stream of future profits by
one percent, but, because of lack of experience with that innovation, the
shareholders are quite uncertain about that number. Perhaps the innovation
will lower profits by three percent, or perhaps it will raise them by one
percent. The shareholders' expectations of the possible outcomes might fit
onto a bell curve, with the most likely outcome being a one percent loss
and other outcomes progressively less likely the further they are from this
midpoint. An investor with a completely undiversified portfolio would
certainly oppose such an innovation, both because it lowers the company's
expected return and because it raises the variability of the company's
returns. A more diversified investor, however, might well favor such an
Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate'), 83
VA. L. REv. 713 (1997).
38 There are several reasons this might be the case. Klausner notes:
[The value of a contract term] depends on the present value of (a) periodic judicial
rulings that will be issued in the future, (b) common practices that will develop
among firms that implement the term, (c) legal services that will be available to a
firm that must interpret or implement the term, and (d) the effect the term has on
the marketability of the firm's securities.
Klausner, supra note 36, at 774.
39 Id. at 789. To be sure, government interference could lead to too much innovation. If the
government subsidized many different corporate innovations, see infra Section IV.B, it could prevent
firms from taking advantage of network externalities. An analogy to the telephone market may be
useful. If a market is locked into using a particular convention for transmitting telephone signals, then
it might be useful for the government to subsidize an innovation that no party or company would have
an incentive to develop or implement unilaterally. The experience of the innovation might lead to
informational benefits to others considering adopting the technology, and it would provide an installed
base that might make it profitable for later users to adopt it. But if the government oversubsidized lots
of different telephone innovations, then many different technological standards would exist, and no
one would be able to communicate. In the corporate law context, the substantial degree of uniformity
suggests that some encouragement of innovation would be beneficial, although the government should
be aware that, past a certain point, the marginal benefits of subsidized innovation are less than the
marginal cost.
40 In the corporate charter context, see infra Section Il.A, "[e]ven if a state were to offer a
product with greater inherent benefits and even if Delaware were to fail to meet the competition,
uncertainty and delay attending other firms' incorporation and reincorporation decisions could leave
Delaware's market share unchanged." Klausner, supra note 36, at 850. In addition, "[t]here may be
groups of firms that would benefit from a law that differs from Delaware's. Network externalities,
however, may lead states to copy Delaware law rather than attempting to serve such firms." Id.
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innovation. If the innovation turns out to be successful, all of the other
companies in that investor's portfolio can adopt it and reap the benefits.
Of course, a company's adoption of an innovation will not necessarily
produce a clear answer about the effects of that innovation. Moreover, the
effect of an innovation cannot be measured by an event study, because
such studies assess only the market's ex ante prediction about the
innovation's effect.4' Ultimately, innovations are useful to other firms
when they are assessed statistically ex post, and such analysis is easiest
when there are a number of companies that have adopted the innovation
(and a number that have not). Nonetheless, even a single company's
experimentation with an innovation is likely to provide anecdotal evidence
about the innovation's effect.42 With each experiment, the bell curve
indicating the possible outcomes of the innovation will both become
thinner and move to the left or right depending on whether preliminary
indications suggest that it is a failure or a success.
In considering innovations, it is useful to separate small ones from
large ones. With a small innovation, such as a minor change in voting
procedures, one company's experience is likely to provide only a small
amount of evidence about the advisability of the innovation. At the same
time, however, such an innovation is unlikely to lead to large changes in
the returns a firm can expect to earn. Thus, with respect to such
innovations, shareholders would in general prefer that a number of firms
adopt the innovation, at least initially. Such adoption would provide a
useful experiment in allowing other firms to determine whether to adopt it
as well, without imposing grave costs on the firms adopting it.
Other innovations might be considerably more radical. For example,
imagine a company in which every significant corporate investment
decision required shareholder ratification via votes over the Internet.43
Such a governance option would, of course, represent a significant
departure from existing corporate practice. Even if a shareholder expects
such an experiment to be a failure, the shareholder might well favor the
experiment. The reason is that a single company's experience may provide
41 See Jill E. Fisch, Picking a Winner, 20 J. CORP. L. 451, 467-68 (1995) (review essay)
(noting deficiencies of event studies). See generally Glenn Henderson, Problems and Solutions in
Conducting Event Studies, 57 J. RISK & INS. 282 (1990) (describing the event study methodology). An
additional limitation of event studies is that they may reflect the market's reaction not to a particular
corporate decision "but rather to other developments that coincide with, or even were signaled by, the
decision." Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1435, 1449 (1992).
42 See, e.g., Peter Z. Grossman, The Market for Shares of Companies with Unlimited
Liability: The Case ofAmerican Express, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 63 (1995) (examining the implications of
a case study).
43 For a somewhat less radical proposal, see John C. Wilcox, Electronic Communication




valuable information on the advisability of such a governance scheme.
Even if the experiment failed on the whole, the innovation might produce
some benefits that other companies could adopt with more minor reforms.
And if the experiment succeeded, other firms could follow suit, with
gradually more firms adopting the innovation as more evidence
accumulated about its benefits.
To be sure, shareholders will not favor every corporate law
innovation. Some may seem so foolhardy that the chance it might actually
work would not justify the risk. But shareholders are likely to favor at least
most innovations that they believe are likely to have a positive effect on a
company's value. The failure of an innovation would impose only small
costs on a well-diversified shareholder, while a success could bring large
benefits if other firms copy it.
2. Portfolio Diversification
An investor would ideally like to invest in companies with diversified
governance structures for the same reason the investor benefits from other
types of diversification." The reason to invest in a number of different
companies, after all, is that if one company performs poorly, the others
may still perform well. The more different the companies, the better; a
mutual fund investing in hundreds of high-tech companies but no other
companies may be a poorly diversified investment because poor
performance by one such company is likely to correlate with poor
performance by the others.45 Likewise, if one corporate governance
strategy turns out to be unsuccessful, other strategies may succeed, and
corporations with different governance structures are likely to have less
correlated performance than corporations with the same governance
structure.
At first blush, this type of diversification may seem to be relatively
unimportant, and indeed I do not wish to exaggerate its importance. After
all, a company will succeed or fail primarily based on the success of the
products or services that it offers. Corporate governance is likely to affect
performance only at the margins. Thus, while a technology company and
an agriculture company are likely to have relatively uncorrelated
performances, two technology companies with differently structured
boards of directors are still likely to have relatively correlated
44 For an accessible introduction to portfolio theory, see Harvey E. Bines, Modern Portfolio
Theory and Investment Management Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 721,
734-50(1976).
45 See, e.g., Wallace Wen Yeu Wang, Corporate Versus Contractual Mutual Funds: An
Evaluation of Structure and Governance, 69 WASH. L. REV. 927, 936 (1994) ("[Tjhe riskiness of a
portfolio depends on the co-variance (the extent to which asset prices move together) of its holding,
not on the average of the risks associated with its individual investments.").
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performance. The claim that governance structure can have only marginal
diversification benefits, however, may stem from a limited view of the
relevance of governance structure. Whether elections of directors are held
every year or two is not likely to make a big difference, 4' and diversifying
across firms that take different approaches to such a question may do little.
But governance decisions can potentially have great consequences.
Imagine two firms, one of which has a higher percentage of outside
directors than the other.47 The different incentives of outside directors may
lead to different corporate approaches regardless of the firm's industry.
For example, the outside directors may be. less likely to adopt a poison
pill.
48
Such a decision could have significant implications. On one hand,
adoption of a poison pill might aggravate agency costs by entrenching
management and thus lead to stagnation; 49 on the other hand, refusal to
adopt a poison pill might cause alienation and disenchantment among
management, leading to lower performance.50 This is, of course, not a
debate that we need to resolve now. The important point is that we may
recognize governance decisions as potentially critical yet not be sure
which is the best approach. In such a situation, we may well expect firms
that make the same decision to have relatively correlated returns, just as
we expect firms in different industries to have correlated returns. Thus, an
investor who is already well-diversified with respect to industry groups
may benefit from diversifying within each industry group with respect to
governance structure. 5'
46 But see Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance:
The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187 (1991); D. Gordon Smith, Corporate
Governance and Managerial Incompetence: Lessons from Kmart, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1037, 1135-36
(1996) (arguing that frequent elections of directors may make boards less representative).
47 See generally Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate
Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 898 (1996) (assessing the impact
and significance of outside directors' representation on boards).
48 See, e.g., Paul Mallette & Karen L. Fowler, Effects of Board Composition and Stock
Ownership on the Adoption of "Poison Pills," 35 ACAD. MGMT. 1010 (1992).
49 Cf Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 (1981) (urging manager
passivity).
50 See, e.g., Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Antitakeover-Amendments, Managerial
Entrenchment, and the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 71 VA. L. REv. 1257, 1292-93 (1985)
(discussing the benefits ofantitakeover charter provisions).
51 In addition, less dramatic governance decisions could also have large effects, even in
unanticipated ways. Indeed, in the example I have provided, the companies' boards might have been
formed before the poison pill question ever arose. The decision about how many independent directors
to have might not have seemed particularly critical but had implications later. Moreover, differences in
board composition could arise from differences in the devices used to select board members. Such
structural differences in corporate governance may initially seem trivial, but they ultimately can have a
large effect on how companies are run. Because these effects can be unpredictable, an investor is best
off diversifying across governance structures, even where it is not immediately obvious how the
governance structures will lead to different business decisions.
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B. Why Firms Won't Innovate Enough
It might at first seem that firms will give investors what they want. If
corporate law innovation is desirable, then as long as a state's law consists
of default provisions that a corporation can override, either in its charter or
through some other mechanism, a corporation will have incentives to
provide the innovation that its shareholders desire. 2 Indeed, under
Delaware's business trust law, a firm can adopt a wide variety of
nontraditional structures.5 3 And if shareholders benefit from corporate law
innovation, they will be willing to pay for it. Corporations that seek to
maximize the funds that they receive in the capital markets will thus
innovate to receive more funds from investors.
There are five primary problems with this optimistic view. First,
many provisions of corporate law are mandatory provisions rather than
defaults that a corporation can override5 4 To be sure, a corporate law will
often tolerate small and even medium-size changes in the mechanics of
governance. But the relative uniformity of existing corporations may
entrench certain basic features of corporate structure into corporate codes.
For example, a state law might provide that all power shall reside in a
board of directors, not recognizing that it might be possible to construct a
corporate law structure without such a board (or with two boards, in a nod
to bicameralism). More importantly, there are many provisions of federal
law that a corporation cannot override, for example, federal securities
laws.55
52 See Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory
Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599 (1989). But see Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: The
Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U. CHI. L REV. 1391, 1418 (1992) ("[A]n
appreciation of the constraints on private ex ante contracting undermines the causal theory that
competition among states will cause legislatures to pass efficient default rules.").
53 See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3801-3820 (1995 & Supp. 1996); Wendell Fenton &
Eric A. Mazie, Delaware Business Trusts, in 2 THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND
BusiNEss ORGANIZATIONS §§ 25.1-25.12 (R. Franklin Babott & Jesse A. Finkelstein eds., Supp.
1997).
54. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 3 ("Any theory of corporate law
must account for the mandatory as well as the enabling features, and must account for the pattern of
regulation .... "). In listing "things [that] are off-limits," Easterbrook and Fischel note:
States almost uniformly forbid perpetual directorships (persons who cannot be
displaced by holders of a majority of the voting power). They set quorum rules (on
critical decisions, a third of the board and sometimes half of the investors must
participate) and require 'major' transactions to be presented to the board
(occasionally shareholders too) rather than stand approved by managers or a
committee. States also forbid the sale of votes divorced from the investment
interest and the accumulation of votes in a corporate treasury ....
Id.; Cf Schwartz, supra note 20, at 558 ("[A] substantial federal overlay on the prevailing state law
system already exists. While no single federal statute deals with the governance of corporations
generally, numerous statutes affect corporate governance.").
55 See Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 1 (1993) ("In the
twentieth century, state corporate law norms for the large publicly held corporation have been
progressively supplanted by federal standards, particularly those originating in federal securities
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Second, important decisions about whether to innovate structurally
are often made by a firm's management, or at least management plays an
important role. 56 Unlike well-diversified shareholders, managers (and, to a
lesser but still significant extent, directors 57) have all their eggs in one
basket.58  Thus, on one hand, they will not directly benefit from the
portfolio diversification and informational externality benefits that the
firm's innovation might provide to its well-diversified shareholders.5 9
They may benefit indirectly, to be sure, because shareholders may
appreciate the courage of a manager or a director who recognizes that
innovation will help shareholders and thus innovates. In theory, managers
who innovate and thereby benefit their shareholders might be rewarded
with higher salaries or with better job security.6 ° In practice, however,
innovation is likely to greatly reduce their job security. If a corporate law
innovation fails, the manager may well be blamed, even if the decision to
undertake the innovation was ex ante beneficial. Moreover, a corporate
law innovation may increase the probability that the company itself will
fail, further harming the manager. Finally, managers themselves often have
significant shareholdings in the companies they run,6 ' and their portfolios
are thus not likely to be as well diversified as those of more typical
investors. Therefore, as owners, managers will be less able to tolerate the
risks that corporate law innovation entails.
Although shareholders will be willing to pay a premium for the
diversification benefits that they receive from innovation by some firms,
law."); see also Larry E. Ribstein, Efficiency, Regulation and Competition. A Comment on
Easterbrook and Fischel's Economic Structure of Corporate Law, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 254, 270 (1991)
(book review) ("Note that federal baselines played an important role in shaping even those corporate
terms that have long been regarded as controlled by permissive state statutes.").
56 See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MtcH. L. REv. 520, 591-
95 (1990) (discussing the importance of management agenda control); see also Lynne L. Dallas, The
Control and Conflict of Interest Voting Systems, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1, 1 (1992) (arguing that "current
laws fall short of providing shareholders the right to vote on fundamental organic changes when the
economic, operational, control, and legal structures of a corporation are considered").
57 See Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U.
CIN. L. REV. 649, 698-99 (1995) (discussing the problem of risk aversion among directors and the
need to induce risk-positive behavior),
58 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the
Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 19 (1986) ("Because the manager cannot spread his risks, or
escape them safely in the event of insolvency, he is economically wedded to his firm.... [M]anagers
will be more risk averse than their shareholders."). See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk-Taking
and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 296 (1991) (explaining why
managers might be biased towards high-variance projects when insolvency is a danger).
59 See Hu, supra note 26, at 1281-82 ("[M]odem financial theory suggests that corporations
concerned about the well-being of shareholders will generally take more risks than corporations
concerned about the entity's own well-being ... ").
60 See Coffee, supra note 58, at 82 (discussing the possibility of implicit contracts with "an
expectation of an ex post setting-up so that managers who contributed disproportionately to the firm's
welfare would be specially rewarded"). Of course, stock options may also align managers' incentives
with those of shareholders.
61 See, e.g., Louis Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 730, 737 (1985).
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they will free-ride off the informational externalities that corporate law
innovation provides. Suppose an investor holds stock in 500 companies.
The investor, according to the analysis above, might well be pleased if one
company innovated in some way because of diversification and other
benefits. Placing aside the diversification benefit, however, once a firm in
the shareholder's portfolio innovates, the riskiness of the innovator's stock
will rise. Thus, even if the shareholder would vote for the innovation, the
value of the security will decrease once the innovation is adopted. An
investor receives the informational benefit regardless of who owns the
company, but managers and owners of the undiversified company face the
full risk of the innovation.
Thus, while the diversification benefit will tend to raise a company's
stock price, the informational benefits are externalized. Because
innovation does increase the riskiness of firms, in some cases this risk cost
will exceed the diversification benefit, even though the risk cost might be
less than the sum of the diversification benefit and the informational
benefit. This alone does not mean that innovation will be drastically
underprovided for, however, since shareholders may have an incentive to
vote for an innovation, even though they realize that it will lower the value
of the particular corporation's stock. But shareholders do not usually
determine directly whether a corporation innovates, and managers are
likely to take little solace in the fact that though innovation lowered their
company's stock price, it raised the stock prices of other companies within
the shareholders' portfolio. After all, if the drop in stock price is
significant enough, a takeover firm might be able to profit by acquiring the
company and undoing the innovation,62 even though the shareholders in
fact desired the innovation in the first place.
Third, the owners of a firm at the time of an initial public offering are
similarly undiversified. They will thus care principally about the returns
from the initial public offering, and they will be concerned both about the
expected magnitude of the returns and the variance of the expected returns.
Thus, even if they suspect that shareholders will be willing to pay more for
the company's security because of an innovation in its corporate charter,
they may not be sure. They thus face an additional level of uncertainty that
investors do not face-uncertainty about whether the portfolio
diversification benefits of an innovation to shareholders will exceed the
risk costs of the innovation. Because the owners are undiversified, they
may be quite risk-averse and unwilling to take a chance. Thus, the owners
62 The literature, of course, focuses on the agency cost reduction benefits of takeovers. See,
e.g., Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG.
119, 129-31 (1992). But if a firm is producing a costly positive externality, a takeover designed to stop
the externality may be socially inefficient.
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will often decline to innovate even when ex post such innovation would
have been profitable for them.
Fourth, the market may inaccurately perceive a decision to innovate
as a signal that something is wrong with a company. 63 When a particular
company makes a decision to innovate, investors will wonder why this
company did so rather than any other company. One plausible reason for
innovating is that existing structures have proven ineffective at addressing
the company's needs. To some extent, of course, investors may have
already recognized that existing structures are inefficient for a particular
company. But investors also may take a decision to innovate as a signal
that managers are less optimistic about the company's future than the
market, just as the market considers insider sales of securities to be a sign
that something is wrong.14 For example, a decision in an initial public
offering to make a company relatively easy to take over might signal to
investors that the owners of the company do not have much faith in the
managers.65 With established companies, in extreme cases, corporate law
innovation might even be seen as a desperate effort by managers to save
their own jobs.66 Thus, because investors may be unable to separate cases
in which managers are innovating to maximize shareholders' utility from
cases in which they are innovating out of desperation, companies will
sometimes decide not to innovate even when they should. This adverse
selection problem, moreover, will lead to an unraveling effect; as firms
that are marginal candidates for innovation decide not to innovate, the
costs to other firms of innovation will rise, and they too may gradually
decide not to innovate.67
63 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 29, at 1569-73 (arguing that there may be less innovation in
corporate law because of signaling and concluding that "innovation may be harder in a regime of
contractual freedom"). See generally Stephen A. Ross, The Determination of Financial Structure: The
Incentive-Signaling Approach, 8 BELL J. ECON. 23 (1977) (describing how investors may perceive
actions as signals of other actions).
64 See, e.g., Jordan Eth & Michael Dicke, Insider Stock Sales in Rule lOb-5 Corporate
Disclosure Cases: Separating the Innocent from the Suspicious,.1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 97 (1994).
65 For a summary of other explanations for why firms might include antitakeover provisions
in their charters, see Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value?
Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 88-89 (2001).
66 The manager, in an effort to rescue his job, may effectively roll the dice by taking risks
that are excessive from shareholders' point of view. Cf Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Double Liability of Bank Shareholders: A Look at the New Data, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 933, 933-
34 (1993) (discussing the possibility of excess risk-taking by banks).
67 Unraveling thus may mean that no firms innovate. See generally Steven P. Croley & Jon
D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alternate Explanation for Recent Events in Products Liability, 8
YALE J. ON REG. 1, 28-50 (1991) (discussing the possibility of unraveling of risk pools).
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C. Why States Won't Innovate Enough
Even if firms do not have the incentive to innovate, a federalist
system in which states can make certain provisions of corporate law
mandatory could fill the gap. On this view, states would have incentives to
innovate because the firms that they incorporate would receive the
benefits. Moreover, by innovating, a state can attract more firms to the
state, increasing any fees that the firms must pay to be controlled by the
state's law. With many states innovating in many different ways, investors
will receive the benefits of both portfolio diversification (by holding shares
in companies taking advantage of different states' innovations) and
informational externalities (by learning from the results of state
innovation).
This story, however, is also too optimistic, as there are several
reasons that states will not want to innovate. First, if a state's goal is to
attract new firms, then it will not innovate, because innovation consisting
of mandatory terms will in fact deter new firms. If the owners or managers
of a firm do not want an innovative corporate law structure, they will not
choose a state that provides such a structure. Indeed, some firms that have
selected an innovative state might have an incentive to change their initial
selection and switch to a noninnovating state.68 Thus, if a firm would not
decide to innovate on its own, it will not want to be in a state that will or
might force innovation upon it.
Second, the informational benefits of a state's innovations are largely
externalized. If a state innovation proves to be successful, then other states
will be able to copy it. Ian Ayres has observed this problem in the context
of corporate charters.69 States might have incentives to innovate if they
could be assured of capturing all the benefits of their innovations. Because
one state cannot prevent another from copying its corporate law structures,
however, states cannot capture these benefits. At the same time, of course,
if a state's innovation proves ill-advised, the firms in that state will
exclusively bear the cost. While a state will still receive some benefit from
being the first innovator if an innovation proves successful-that is, firms
in the state will enjoy the benefits of the innovation sooner-these
immediate benefits may be only a small portion of total benefits in present
discounted value terms.7°
68 Cf Demetrios G. Kaouris, Note, Is Delaware Still a Haven for Incorporation?, 20 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 965, 999-1003 (1995) (providing examples of reasons that some firms decide to reincorporate
out of Delaware).
69 See Ian Ayres, Supply-Side Inefficiencies in Corporate Charter Competition: Lessons
from Patents, Yachting and Bluebooks, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 541, 545-50 (1995).
70 See, e.g., id. at 548 (discussing the incentives to being a first-mover).
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Third, a state's innovations will typically affect all firms that have
chosen the state, unless the state makes the innovation optional. This may
provide too much innovation, especially for a leading corporate law state.
If investors would like just one firm to try an innovation, then a state that
forces an innovation on all firms, or even on just all new firms, would be
giving investors more innovation than they wanted. Thus, the risk of the
innovation might exceed the portfolio diversification benefits. Moreover, if
firms that have chosen that state represent a sizable portion of an investor's
portfolio, the imposition of an innovation on all firms within that state
might defeat the goal of portfolio diversification. When innovation is
forced on a large number of firms, investors might want to diversify by
holding shares in firms that have not been subject to the innovation.
Fourth, states may be just as risk-averse as firms.71 When a state
considers an innovation, it will not be sure how successful the innovation
will be. If the innovation is successful, the state will attract more firms and
thus will benefit, but if the innovation is unsuccessful, firms may exit the
state. Even if the potential benefits were greater than the potential costs,
the risk of failure may deter states from innovating. While one might
expect that a state would be more insulated from risk than individual firms,
that may not be true, particularly in states that have balanced budget
requirements. 72 In such states, any loss of revenue due to a failed
innovation must be made up by spending cuts or tax increases; and voters
may react by punishing politicians, even if they do not understand the
source of the change. Even in other states, debt may be a salient political
issue, and officeholders may not wish to risk having an unexpected deficit.
Fifth, a state may have a relatively short time horizon. According to
public choice theory, politicians privilege short-term results over long-
term gains, because short-term results are likely to affect elections.
73
Therefore, if the costs of an innovation are felt immediately, while the
benefits will not be received until the future, a state may resist innovation
even where the present discounted value of benefits exceeds the present
discounted value of costs. This is particularly problematic with respect to
the positive informational externality, since the fruits of a better
71 See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of
Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 214
(1997).
72 See generally David Lubecky, The Proposed Federal Balanced Budget Amendment: The
Lesson from State Experience, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 563 (1986) (assessing the effect of state balanced
budget amendments on spending).
73 See, e.g., DWIGHT R. LEE & RICHARD MCKENZIE, REGULATING GOVERNMENT: A
PREFACE TO CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 127-31 (1987); Philip Jones & John Cullis, Legitimate and





understanding of corporate law because of innovation will not materialize
immediately.
II. Paradigms of Corporate Law Innovation
If firms have insufficient incentives to innovate and states have
insufficient incentives to innovate, then we are likely not to have stumbled
upon the best corporate law structure imaginable. While it could
fortuitously be true that the structure of corporations we have selected is in
fact the best structure, and indeed that the structure maximizes shareholder
wealth for each corporation, this seems unlikely. After all, some changes
in corporate law structure that one would expect to fail might actually
succeed. And the differences in the structure of corporate law
internationally suggest that our particular arrangement is not the
inexorable outcome of a priori logic. 74 To be sure, our corporate law might
be better than other countries', and it may even be better as a result of our
system of federalism. But the existence of continued debate on all varieties
of corporate law questions in legal academia suggests at the least that we
cannot be confident that we have arrived at the best possible system.
This Part explores the consequence of firms' inadequate incentives to
innovate for the path of corporate law. In particular, it considers four
paradigms of corporate law innovation, three already existing and one
designed to correct imperfections in each of the other three. The existing
paradigms are that corporate law is a "race to the bottom," that it is a "race
to the top," and that it is a "race to nowhere in particular." Over the years,
conventional wisdom has moved from the first of these paradigms to the
second and the third. In this Section, I hope to move conventional wisdom
to the fourth paradigm, which envisions corporate law as a "crawl to the
top."
My argument in this Part is largely theoretical rather than empirical;
this is because the argument is intended to apply to any area of corporate
law that could conceivably be constructed through a system of competitive
federalism. I will bring in empirical evidence later when I specifically
apply the theoretical analysis to states' actual experiences with corporate
charter competition 75 and to other imaginable areas of state competition.
At the same time, of course, the argument will be most applicable to the
context of corporate charter competition, and occasionally I may refer to
the theory of corporate charter competition explicitly. This is a necessary
74 See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 118-47
(1993) (discussing international differences in corporate law); Dan Feino Henderson, Security Markets
in the United States and Japan: Distinctive Aspects Molded by Cultural, Social, Economic, and
Political Differences, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 263 (1991) (same).
75 See infra Section l1I.A.
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concession, because the existing literature on paradigms of corporate law
focuses almost exclusively on the corporate charter context. In this
Section, however, I do not use "corporate law" necessarily to mean
selection of the corporate charter or "reincorporation" to mean a change in
the state of a corporation's charter. The framework, rather, is that the states
are competing to provide some set of laws or procedures to corporations in
exchange for fees or other forms of compensation.
A. The Race to the Bottom
The notion that corporate law is a race to the bottom was first
propounded in a famous article by William Cary.76 The basic thesis is
simple. Because corporate law is determined by states, the states will
compete with each other for corporate franchise fees. 77 To induce firms to
locate in their states, legislators will need to provide benefits to managers.
States will thus create corporate law structures that expropriate wealth
from shareholders to enhance the private benefits of managers. 78 Such
expropriation is inefficient, because it imposes deadweight losses, that is,
the benefits to managers are smaller than the losses to shareholders.
Selection of an incorporation state, under Cary's view, presents a classic
agency problem,7 9 and the way to overcome this agency problem is
effectively to federalize corporate law. °
The main problem with Cary's thesis is that shareholders may in fact
have ways of overcoming this agency problem even within a system of
competitive federalism. The next Section will discuss this criticism and the
claim that the race is in fact to the top. There are, however, other problems
that become clear when viewed through the lens of this Article's analysis
of innovation. First, even if states were solely concerned about benefiting
managers, it is not clear that there would necessarily be a race among
states in providing such concessions. After all, it might be unclear whether
a change in corporate law would in fact benefit managers, and thus risk-
averse managers might resist innovation, both by their corporations and by
states. 8 Cary's analysis speaks to the location in which corporate law
allegedly finds itself (the bottom) and perhaps even the direction in which
corporate law is moving (even deeper). It does not, however, speak to the
speed of the transformation (i.e., whether it is a race or a crawl).
76 See Cary, supra note 1. A more recent article arguing that corporate law may in some
respects be a race to the bottom is Bebchuk, supra note 41.
77 See Cary, supra note 1, at 684 ("Perhaps there is no public policy left in Delaware
corporate law except the objective of raising revenue.").
78 See id. at 670-84.
79 See id. at 698-99.
80 See id. at 696-705 (arguing for federal minimum standards).
81 See supra Section 1.B.
Vol. 20:139, 2003
Crawl to Top
Second, when innovations in corporate law will clearly be to the
benefit of both shareholders and managers, states will adopt them, lest
managers incorporate or reincorporate in other states.8" Much of what is in
the interest of managers, after all, is in shareholders' interests too.
Managers would like their companies to perform well, because good
performance increases their reputation and job security. In addition,
managers may in fact care about the corporations they manage, either
because they have shareholdings in the firms or simply because they care
about the quality of their work and would like to support shareholders.
Thus, some of the corporate law structure that develops on account of
pleasing managers will benefit shareholders.
Third, even if states do make concessions to managers at the expense
of shareholders, this does not necessarily mean that the states are at the
bottom relative to where the federal government would be. Indeed,
empirical evidence suggests that when a state does innovate in corporate
law and that innovation appears to be successful, other states adopt the
innovation relatively quickly.83 Such rapid adoption of successful
innovations indicates at the least that states are responsive to managers'
concerns. The federal government, by contrast, may not be as responsive
in passing legislation, given the relatively slow pace of congressional
action.84 Thus, assuming that a federal regime and a federalist regime
began with the same corporate law, it is not clear that the federal regime
would perform better at improving corporate law than the federalist regime
over time. Even granting Cary's claim that the states will be overly eager
to please managers (and that the federal government by contrast would not
be), some of this eagerness will lead to innovations that in fact help
shareholders too.
B. The Race to the Top
Several years after Cary proclaimed a race to the bottom, Ralph
Winter challenged Cary's thesis. 85 Not only was corporate law not a race
to the bottom, Winter claimed, it was in fact a race to the top. Owners of
firms going public will want to maximize revenues from initial public
offerings,86 and managers will be constrained by their need to ensure that
82 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 41, at 1440-41 ("To be sure, because the interests of
managers and shareholders are somewhat aligned, there are many corporate issues with respect to
which managers seek, and states in turn have an incentive to provide, rules that enhance shareholder
value.").
83 See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, I J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 225, 233-42 (1985).
84 See ROMANO, supra note 74, at 49.
85 See Winter, supra note 2.
86 See id. at 256 (presenting the argument as a four-step syllogism). Judge Winter also
states, "If management is to secure initial capital ... it must attract investors away from the almost
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the company performs successfully in the marketplace.87 Thus, they will
choose the state that is likely to produce the greatest profit for the firm
over time. States will recognize that to attract firms, they must worry not
about attracting managers but about attracting the owners of firms
undergoing initial public offerings. Thus, the. states will adopt corporate
law structures that maximize shareholder wealth. These structures will also
maximize the returns from initial public offerings, because bidders will be
willing to pay more for shares in companies with shareholder-maximizing
corporate law than for shares in companies that allow managers to
expropriate superoptimal private benefits.88
Moreover, according to the race-to-the-top story, shareholders may
have sufficient power to make already existing public firms reincorporate
if doing so is in their best interests." Thus, states both will seek to attract
firms by appealing to shareholders with wealth-maximizing rules and will
be wary of deferring so much to managers that shareholders will have an
incentive to try to fire the managers and reincorporate their firms
elsewhere. This aspect of the race-to-the-top story has less theoretical
appeal in the abstract than the idea that states will try to attract owners at
the time of the initial public offering. With respect to firms making the
decision where to incorporate initially, the race-to-the-top story is a priori
more convincing than Cary's race to the bottom, because there is no reason
that states would make concessions to managers at this time. With respect
to firms deciding about whether to reincorporate, however, it is impossible
to draw an a priori conclusion. Perhaps shareholders have enough power
that they can force firms to reincorporate in states that maximize
shareholder value, but perhaps managers have enough power to
reincorporate in states that maximize value to them.90 Thus, as a theoretical
matter, the race-to-the-bottom theory could be more accurate than the race-
infinite variety of competing opportunities." Id. at 257. See also Bebchuk, supra note 41, at 1479 ("In a
world with only initial incorporations, a state seeking to maximize local incorporations must make its
corporate law attractive to those parties who control companies at the time that the companies first go
public.").
87 See Winter, supra note 2, at 257.
88 In a more recent commentary, Judge Winter noted, "I am far more confident that
Professor Cary's argument about the race to the bottom is wrong than I am that my argument that
Delaware is leading the race to the top is right." Winter, supra note 17, at 1529. He added: "[T]he race
to the top may be slow because Delaware is the only state devoted exclusively to maximizing franchise
taxes and may need only to offer a code marginally more efficient than other states . I... "d. at 1530.
89 See, e.g., Bernard Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis,
84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542 (1996) (arguing that firms can reincorporate easily, thus making the content of
a particular state's corporate law trivial). But cf ROMANO, supra note 74, at 34-35 (noting that the
large costs of reincorporation may deter some firms from reincorporating).
90 In competition for corporate charters, however, a shareholder vote is generally a
prerequisite to reincorporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (1997); ROBERT C. CLARK,
CORPORATE LAW § 10.2.4, at 416-17 (1986). Nonetheless, as Professor Bebchuk stresses, shareholders
may be imperfectly informed. See Bebchuk, supra note 41, at 1472-75. In addition, managers may be
able to induce reincorporation by tying a vote for reincorporation to some other matter. See id. at 1475.
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to-the-top theory if reincorporations were more important than initial
incorporation decisions and if managers in fact had more power than
shareholders in reincorporation decisions.
Though its inverse, the race-to-the-top theory shares a principal flaw
of the race to the bottom: Even if states seek to create rules that appeal to
owners at the time of an initial public offering, there is no reason that
states will necessarily wish to innovate. 9' As indicated above, owners of
firms at the time of an offering are likely to be risk-averse and thus wary
of any innovation in corporate law structures that will lead to uncertainty
about the returns they can expect.92 Thus, while a state's initial choice of
corporate law is likely to be more favorable to shareholders than under the
race-to-the-bottom story, there is no guarantee that corporate law will
progress quickly toward the best possible corporate law.
In addition, the race-to-the-top theory is most likely to be valid if the
corporate law race is a race worth watching. That is, if fifty states (plus
perhaps the District of Columbia 93) are competing neck and neck, or if
there are a fair number of competitors near the front of the race, one might
expect states to do whatever they can to win. After all, if there is a large
prize and a number of contestants each of whom has only a small
percentage chance of winning, then each contestant might be better off
taking a bold move than acting conservatively. In a road race, by
increasing the variance of one's expected finishing time, a runner with an
initially small probability of winning increases that probability. So, with a
number of contestants entering a marathon's final mile, it may well make
sense for a runner to sprint; even though this may lower the runner's
expected finishing time (there is a fair chance the runner will get out of
breath and have to walk the rest of the way), it gives the runner a chance of
breaking out of the pack.94 And so with states, if there were a number of
leading incorporation states, any one state might have an incentive to
innovate boldly in hopes of capturing the title.
The race, however, becomes much less exciting when one state is
clear out in front. 95 If there is one mile left in a marathon, and one runner
91 See supra Section I.C.
92 See supra Section I.B.
93 Cf. G. Michael Epperson & Joan M. Camy, The Capital Shareholder's Ultimate
Calamity: Pierced Corporate Veils and Shareholder Liability in the District of Columbia, Maryland,
and Virginia, 37 CATH. U. L. REv. 605, 614-20 (1988) (discussing a unique facet of D.C. corporate
law).
94 See, e.g., London Marathon Has Thrilling Finishes, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 14,
1997 (describing sprints to finish leading to two- and one-second finishes in men's and women's
marathons).
95 For a real world example in the context of charter competition, see Keith Paul Bishop,
The Delaware of the West: Does Nevada Offer Better Treatment for Directors?, INSIGHTS, Mar. 1993,
at 20, which discusses Nevada's attempt to compete with Delaware for corporate charters. See also
Cary, supra note 1, at 665 (discussing an earlier attempt by Nevada); cf id. at 666 n.18 (noting an
attempt by Michigan to "out-Delaware Delaware").
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knows he has a substantial lead, sprinting risks losing the lead should he
falter. Instead, the runner will jog to the finish. Other runners, meanwhile,
will also not have an incentive to push their hardest. They cannot win, but
assuming they are better off finishing than collapsing, they too are likely to
jog the remainder of the race.
In the corporate law context, if one state is already far ahead of the
other states, the leading state will not have an incentive to innovate boldly,
because that state has nothing to gain and everything to lose. Likewise,
trailing states will not have much incentive to try to overtake the leading
state. To beat the leading state, a trailing state would need to do more than
duplicate the leading state's corporate law structures. Given the real thing,
which has proved its mettle over time, and a copy, which may or may not
work as well in the long run, a firm will pick the real thing, that is, the
leading state, over the copying state. Moreover, as Ehud Kamar has
argued, a leading state may design its law to make it more difficult for
other states to copy.96 Thus, a trailing state will need to seek to create a
better corporate law than the leading state if it is to take the lead. That is, it
will need to innovate boldly. But such bold innovation invites the risk of
catastrophic failure; an innovating trailing state might, for example, lose a
number of existing firms who choose to reincorporate elsewhere, and a
failed innovation may end up lowering the returns of firms that decide not
to flee.
Moreover, a trailing firm that innovates boldly may face an additional
obstacle: the prospect that the leading firm may copy the innovation and,
indeed, may copy the innovation not just when it proves to be successful
but immediately. Ian Ayres has raised this possibility by analogizing
competition for corporate charters to a yachting race.97 A yacht racing only
against a time clock will always seek to position its sails in the direction
that seems likely to best capture the wind. But in a two-yacht race, the
trailing yachtsmen might position their sails differently, in the hope that an
unexpected gust of wind could propel their yacht forward. The leading
yachtsmen, however, might then "cover" the trailing yacht by positioning
their sails in the same direction.98 Just as both yachts thus end up moving
relatively slowly, a leading state might copy even regressive innovations
96 See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998). Kamar argues that Delaware enhances its competitiveness by making
its law more indeterminate, thus for example, making it difficult for another state to imitate Delaware
law without hiring its judges. See id. at 1927-39. Because the amount of indeterminacy that results is
suboptimal from a social welfare perspective, see id. at 1919-23, Delaware makes it more likely that
another state will be able to surpass it, but less likely otherwise that other states will come close to or
equal it.
97 See Ayres, supra note 69, at 550-56.
98 See id. at 551-52 & n.35; cf ROMANO, supra note 74, at 16 (stating that "(Delaware]
excels because when it is not the first to innovate, it is among the first to imitate").
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of other states.99 Even though the leading state may expect the innovations
to fail, it will not lose its lead as long as the trailing states have adopted the
same innovations. And recognizing this possibility, the trailing states will
not have much incentive to adopt the innovation in the first place.
For all these reasons, the race to the top is likely to be faster if there
are a number of leading contenders than if there is a sole dominant leader.
But what determines this equilibrium? To some extent, the answer depends
on the size of the spoils to the winner and the losses to the loser. Let us
assume that a race starts with at least a few states in contention. If there is
a great advantage to being the leading state, that is, if the spoils are large,
then as long as there are initially a number of leading contenders, there
will likely be a sprint leading to establishment of a leader. If, by contrast, a
handful of states more or less share the spoils, then being number one is
not much better than being number two, and no state will have an incentive
to sprint forward. Whether a winner-takes-all system is ex ante best is thus
an empirical question. Even if it is ex ante best to adopt a winner-takes-all
system, there may come a time when a leader has emerged, and switching
to a system in which several states share the lead, if such a switch were
possible, would increase innovation.'00 The issue may turn on the costs to
a state of being not merely a trailing state but a laggard state far behind the
pack. If there is little difference between finishing second and finishing
last, then states will have large incentives to make bold moves for the lead
if there is a large advantage to being first.
On the other hand, if there is a large difference between finishing
second and finishing last, then states will be hesitant to innovate boldly in
an effort to take the lead. In this case, there may be more innovation if the
states immediately following the leading state substantially share the spoils
with the leading state. This is because the leading states in this situation
may still need to innovate somewhat to prevent themselves from falling
behind, while if the winner takes all the spoils, no one will innovate
because the states just behind the leader will not want to risk finishing last
and the leader will thus be able to coast along in front.
Through the lens of innovation, the race-to-the-top story is thus too
simple, for it misses many of the dynamics that will occur in real world
races among states. Ultimately, the speed of the race will depend on a
99 Ayres urges that this may help explain Delaware's adoption of antitakeover provisions in
the 1980s. See Ayres, supra note 69, at 555-56. For other explanations of Delaware's actions, see
ROMANO, supra note 74, which stresses that Delaware lagged behind other states in passing
antitakeover statutes. See also Schwartz, supra note 20, at 554 ("Delaware adopted relatively modest
antitakeover provisions at a time when many states provided strong defenses against an unfriendly
takeover."). Cary was the first to note that the dynamics of antitakeover legislation might be different
from those of other corporate law legislation. See Cary, supra note 1, at 668 n.38.
100 See infra Subsection IV.A.3 (discussing the possibility of imposing caps on the number
of firms a single state serves).
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range of factors, including the amount by which the leading state is ahead,
the spoils that the leading state wins relative to those states close behind,
and the cost to a state of falling well behind. Thus, although the race-to-
the-top story may be more plausible than the race-to-the-bottom
alternative, states' desires to attract firms at the time of initial public
offerings does not guarantee that movement toward the top will be a
race. 101
C. The Race to Nowhere in Particular
Although the race-to-the-top theory has dominated the race-to-the-
bottom theory in scholarly commentary, at least in the context of corporate
charters, some scholars have asked whether there is a race at all. Most
importantly, Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller have offered an interest
group alternative to both theories. 02 Under this view, state legislatures are
not directly responsive to either shareholders or their managers, but to
interest groups.' Those interest groups wish to maximize the rents that
they can obtain from those firms and care about the number of firms that
incorporate in the state only to the extent that such incorporation increases
the rents they receive. 10 4 For example, a state bar might want to maximize
the amount of legal work that the state's corporate law will produce.
10 5
Thus, the corporate law rules that result will not quite maximize
shareholder value, because the state will create legal rules and procedures
that result in more litigation than shareholders or managers would choose.
Firms thus pay states both in straightforward corporate fees and through
inefficient rents for interest groups. The result is what William Bratton
101 That there is no race could help explain the "corporate law paradox," that is, the survival
of antitakeover provisions that most commentators believe are inefficient. See Robert M. Daines & Jon
D. Hanson, The Corporate Law Paradox: The Case for Restructuring Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J.
577 (1992) (review essay).
102 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987).
103 A more recent account emphasizes that managers of corporations incorporated in
particular states may form a separate interest group and that the relative strength of this interest group
relative to the corporate bar interest group helps explain differential rates of corporate law innovations
across states. See William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715
(1998).
104 See Macey & Miller, supra note 102, at 492.
105 See id. at 506-07; see also ROMANO, supra note 74, at 30 ("Delaware's commanding
position in the charter market may possibly enable the corporate bar to siphon a share of Delaware's
monopoly rents by generating some laws that decrease firm value and increase attorney income."); cf
Schwartz, supra note 20, at 557 ("In fact, the process of writing and amending most corporate statutes
is largely controlled by the corporate bar."). Cary had also noted that Delaware lawyers might have




calls a "race to nowhere in particular"-a corporate law equilibrium that is




Macey and Miller's principal insight-that the utility calculus of
states designing corporate laws may give a large weight to concentrated
interests-is surely correct. Moreover, it implies that corporate law is not
now at the top; for giving rents to interest groups is inefficient, and firms
would thus be better off not paying the rents and instead paying a smaller
amount in increased direct fees to the states. It does not, however,
necessarily contradict the claims that corporate law is a race to the bottom
or a race to the top. After all, the division by a single state of the spoils
among taxpayers and particular interest groups is irrelevant to the conduct
of the race as a whole."' 7 If the total pecuniary cost to a firm of
incorporating in a state is x, it is irrelevant to the firm that some portion of
x goes directly to the state, some portion goes to an interest group, and
some portion is a deadweight loss. The firm cares only about x. And if
another state clearly can provide the same benefits with a lower total
pecuniary cost, a firm will incorporate in that state (or even reincorporate
in that state, if the costs of reincorporation are sufficiently low), regardless
of how that state divides the windfall.
Thus, states will still compete against one another to attract firms-
whether they are attracting managers, and thus racing to the bottom, or
shareholders, and thus racing to the top-even in the interest group
conception. A state may, of course, have a large lead over other states in
the benefits that it provides to firms; if, for example, it supplies a corporate
law viewed as more stable than any other states' and at least as sound in
other ways, it can charge corporations higher fees and rents than other
states.108 As Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar put it, a state may have
market power in the market for corporate law. 109 If corporate law were at
the top (or the bottom, which is really just the top for managers) and the
market for corporate law were truly competitive, then the cost to the state
of administering the corporate law would be equal to the fees a corporation
would pay. 10 Any higher fees, or any rents on top of fees, would mean
106 See William W. Bratton, Corporate Law's Race to Nowhere in Particular, 44 U.
TORONTO L.J. 401 (1994).
107 See Macey & Miller, supra note 102, at 492 ("From the standpoint of shareholders and
corporate managers, both franchise fees and the panoply of indirect costs are largely
interchangeable.").
108 This is, of course, Macey and Miller's view in the context of corporate charter
competition. See id. at 492 & n.86.
109 Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86
CORNELL L. REv. 1205, 1209-14 (2001).
110 This stems from the standard economic assumption that firms in competitive markets
eam zero economic profit. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts.- An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 108 n.99 (1989) ("Economic
profits are the residual earnings after all implicit and opportunity costs are accounted for.").
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that another state could marginally undercut the leading state and induce
firms to reincorporate. But just because rents exist now and do not exist at
the top or the bottom does not mean that rents will always exist or that the
total fees that corporations pay, assuming constant benefits, will not
decrease over time. If other states can improve their corporate law
products to the level of the leading state, that state will need to decrease
the amount it charges to corporations-including both fees and rents-to
stay competitive. Thus, unless one state has so great a lead over other
states that no state will ever be able to close the gap, there will still be
competition among the states to provide a sound corporate law; and though
we may be nowhere in particular for now, nowhere in particular will not be
where we are moving.
D. The Crawl to the Top
Each of the three existing paradigms of corporate law captures
something about how states choose corporate law provisions. The race-to-
the-bottom paradigm shows that because of agency costs, a state might
choose provisions of corporate law that maximize the wealth of managers
rather than of shareholders."' The race-to-the-top paradigm explains that
because firms will choose for initial public offerings those states that offer
the corporate law most likely to maximize shareholder wealth, states will
care about shareholders in designing corporate law provisions. 1 2 And the
race-to-nowhere-in-particular paradigm explains that corporate law may be
inefficient because interest groups may seek inefficient rents." 3 But each
of the paradigms fails to incorporate the dynamics of innovation fully into
its story. Because firms and states have inadequate incentives to innovate,
corporate law is not likely to be racing anywhere.
I thus offer a fourth paradigm, which claims that corporate law is a
"crawl to the top." The label reflects two assertions. First, corporate law
evolves slowly; indeed, the pejorative word "crawl" suggests that it
evolves too slowly." 4 Second, this evolution in the long run is likely to
produce better corporate law structures. The first assertion is the easier to
explain. Regardless of what the endpoint is of corporate law, firms cannot
be expected to undertake risky innovations. States might innovate boldly at
the beginning of the "race" if the leader obtains substantially all of the
benefits of being out in front, but once a leader is established, innovation is
Ill See supra Section ll.A.
112 See supra Section Jl.B.
113 See supra Section lI.C.
114 The phrase "crawl to the top" is perhaps closest to Daniel Fischel's description of a
"climb to the top." Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913, 920 (1982). Fischel's
terminology implies neither that innovation will be swift nor that it will be slow.
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likely to slow down greatly. Thus, to the extent that corporate law evolves
at all, it will evolve at the pace of a crawl.
The second assertion is more speculative. Why should corporate law
move towards the top, rather than towards the bottom or towards nowhere
in particular? The first half of this question is the more straightforward. In
the long run, states that appeal to managers rather than shareholders will
lose ground. Even though reincorporations could in theory lead firms to
change from a shareholder-wealth-maximizing state to one that
expropriates benefits for managers, the race-to-the-top theory is
unambiguously stronger than race-to-the-bottom, at least with respect to
the initial incorporation decision. Moreover, corporate law can provide
means of preventing inefficient reincorporations, for example, by requiring
shareholder approval. 1 5 Thus, even if corporate law contains inefficient
provisions that are designed to benefit managers, firns will generally
prefer to incorporate in states that do not have such provisions. And so, if
corporate law is moving anywhere, then in the distant future, when
perhaps a substantial majority of all firms do not even exist today, we
should expect efficient rules to displace inefficient ones.
The second half of the question is more difficult, and my description
of the disincentives that prevent firms and states from innovating might
seem to suggest that corporate law is likely not to move at all. In this view,
corporate law might be a completed race to nowhere in particular, rather
than a crawl from nowhere in particular to the top. Or, corporate law might
evolve in the future but in unpredictable ways depending on interest group
concerns, and it would thus be a crawl from one nowhere-in-particular to
some other nowhere-in-particular. These views are too pessimistic.
Although firms and states may not generally want to innovate by moving
corporate law in a direction not tried before, nothing in my analysis
suggests that they will not want to adopt innovations that have already
proven themselves." 6 Moreover, there may be rare instances when the
benefits of an innovation for a firm exceed the costs because unique
circumstances exist that the innovation particularly addresses. These
occasional adoptions of innovations will provide data to other firms, and if
they prove successful, firms will adopt them. And even if these
innovations are likely to be relatively small, in an evolutionary process
these small innovations may aggregate to larger ones. Corporate law
evolution will thus proceed in fits and starts, and it may occasionally even
move backwards. In the long run, however, good innovations will tend to
defeat bad, and leading firms that adopt inefficient rules may end up
115 Indeed, supermajority approval could be required for any charter amendment. See
ROMANO, supra note 74, at 88.
116 See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the diffusion of successful
corporate law innovations across the states).
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yielding to unexpected upstarts. And thus we can expect corporate law to
crawl to the top.
1II. Constructing Crawls to the Top in Corporate Law
In explaining why we should expect there not to be enough
innovation in corporate law and why the path of innovation in corporate
law is most likely to be a "crawl to the top," I have attempted to be quite
general and not to limit my analysis to the context of corporate charters.
This may seem peculiar, since the only existing area of state competition,
and thus the only existing crawl to the top, is in that area. Corporate law,
however, is about more than board composition, voting rules, and poison
pills. It encompasses legal rules that constrain not only a firm's internal
decision-making structures but also its interactions with shareholders,
creditors, contracting parties, and indeed society at large. Regimes of
interstate competition could govern all of these types of interactions, and
the purpose of this Part is to broaden our perspective on the possibility of
interstate competition. More specifically, this Part assesses the strengths
and weaknesses of hypothetical interstate competition in a variety of
117
areas.
I have ordered the areas of possible interstate competition that I
explore loosely from most plausible to least plausible, with a recognition
that all of the proposals to introduce competition in areas not having it are
radical, and, given the low likelihood of adoption, more important to
consider as thought experiments than to form into detailed proposals. I
begin with corporate charters, the sole area of corporate law in which there
has been a vibrant regime of competition. Exploration of this area provides
an opportunity to review some empirical results and thus to compare my
theoretical analysis above with the reality. Next, I consider regulation of
exchanges. This is another area in which some competition exists, but the
competition is among private organizations subject to a single federal
regulatory regime. One might instead imagine direct state competition or
competition of private firms operating under state regulatory regimes that
they select. After that, I move to state competition for securities regulation,
117 For views of interstate regulatory competition in areas other than corporate law, see F.H.
Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, Welfare Magnets: The Race for the Top, 5 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141
(1996), Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996), and
Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability Explaining Failures in Competition
Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 67 (1996). The seminal work
on interjurisdictional competition is Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956). Recent works on interjurisdictional competition generally are THOMAS R. DYE,
AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS (1990); and COMPETITION AMONG
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (Daphne A.
Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991). For a thoughtful critique of the Tiebout model, see Bratton &
McCahery, supra note 71.
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an area that is currently subject to federal control but for which a recent
proposal has suggested the alternative of state competition. No
commentators, meanwhile, appear to have suggested state competition for
bankruptcy systems, but recent scholarship on bankruptcy helps underline
the advantages that such a system might offer.
Contemplating the prospect of expanded interstate competition may
seem downright peculiar, given that I have just concluded competition is
likely to produce only a "crawl to the top." Such a criticism, however,
depends on focusing on "crawl" rather than "top." Even if state
competition is slow, it may be faster and more efficient than the alternative
of federal regulation. In each of the Sections that follow, I hope to
compare the attractiveness of state competition with federal regulation. For
each area, I show that, although centralized federal control may have some
advantages, state competition offers significant advantages over federal
regulation. In addition, the strengths of state competition relative to federal
control would be increased if the crawls to the top could be turned into
races, a project that I will turn to in Part IV.
A. Corporate Charters
Competition for corporate charters is perhaps the most obvious place
to look to test the theory that corporate law is a crawl to the top. The
empirical evidence strongly suggests that competition is, in fact, to the
top.l1 Event studies 19 have suggested that when corporations do decide to
reincorporate in Delaware, the leading incorporation state, the value of the
stocks rise moderately, if they change at all.120 This indicates that
shareholders perceive decisions to reincorporate as value-increasing and
thus contradicts the theory that Delaware offers concessions to managers at
the expense of shareholders in an effort to induce reincorporation. Because
there is no theoretical reason to believe that states would offer any
concessions to managers at the time of initial public offerings, or at least
there is no reason that states would offer any such inefficient
concessions, 121 this finding completes the case against the race-for-the-
118 See, e.g., ROMANO, supra note 74, at 9 ("The best assessment of the evidence is that state
chartering is for the better and that Delaware's code, for the most part, benefits shareholders.").
119 For a review of event study methodology, see Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event
Studies and the Law-Part I Technique and Corporate Litigation, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=268283 (last visited Jan. 29, 2002).
120 Event studies on the subject include Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The
Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1989); Peter
Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition" Versus
Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980); Jeffrey Netter & Annette Poulsen, State Corporation Laws
and Shareholders. The Recent Experience, 18 FIN. MGMT. 29 (1989); and Romano, supra note 83.
121 But cf Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Luigi Zingales, Corporate Ownership Structures:
Private Versus Social Optimality, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 55-75 (Randall Morck
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bottom thesis. Corporate law would not inefficiently favor managers at the
incorporation stage, and it does not inefficiently favor managers at the
reincorporation stage, so it does not inefficiently favor managers.
The event studies, however, do not prove that Delaware law is as
efficient as possible, only that it is viewed as more efficient than the laws
of the states from which the specific firms that decide to reincorporate are
switching. Event studies are ultimately just fancy opinion polls; although
they help reveal shareholder anticipations of the effect of the event
analyzed, they do not show whether the event in fact ultimately increases
share value.'22 To do this, we would need to study firms' long-term
performance after deciding whether to reincorporate. In the absence of
firms willing to be randomly selected for reincorporation or to continue
with their existing incorporation, such studies are understandably difficult
to perform successfully. As a consequence, although we can conclude that
shareholders believe that Delaware will probably produce higher returns
than other states, it is possible that innovations that already exist in another
state's law might actually produce greater growth. As discussed in Part I,
firms and states may be risk averse, and, moreover, any informational
externality benefits from a firm's innovation will not be impounded in a
stock price. Just because investors' best guess is that Delaware is the best
place to incorporate therefore does not mean that they believe that
Delaware will produce the highest expected returns over a long period of
time (it might produce lower expected returns but also a lower variance of
returns), and it does not mean that the investors are right.
That corporate charter competition has led to the emergence of a
leader in the race suggests, according to the analysis above, that there is
less competition than there would be if several states were still vigorously
competing for charters. Indeed, the charter race does appear to be more or
less a crawl. Although successful innovations are diffused quickly across
states,123 the trailing states seem reluctant to innovate boldly. While state
corporation codes are not all identical, they are not strikingly different
either, certainly not in comparison to the great differences in corporate
structures that exist internationally. Nonetheless, states other than
Delaware are far behind the leader in the incorporation game.1
24
Of course, just because there is no evidence that state charter
competition has been sufficiently aggressive to constitute a race to the top,
the crawl to the top that exists instead is still likely to be superior to the
ed., 2000) (arguing that initial owners seeking to maximize their proceeds may make choices that are
privately optimal but socially inefficient).
122 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
123 See Romano, supra note 83.
124 See, e.g., Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and
Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORY. L. 885, 889 (1990); Kaouris, supra note 68, at 1012 tbl.4 (showing Delaware
well ahead in a class of reincorporations).
Vol. 20:139, 2003
Crawl to Top
alternative of federal regulation. For one thing, the past existence of
charter competition may have led to more innovation than would have
existed in its absence, as Delaware innovated to improve upon the
corporate law of New Jersey, which had previously been the dominant
state. 125 Moreover, the federal government probably would not be boldly
innovative either, and indeed we would not want it to be, because any
change in a mandatory federal regime would affect all firms and thus
would provide neither portfolio diversification nor much in the way of
informational benefits, since uniform innovation would produce no control
group. There would likely be even less innovation, as at least under the
state system, small innovations that appear unequivocally to be successful
become widely adopted. In short, charter competition both helps to verify
the theoretical arguments for the crawl-to-the-top paradigm offered above
and suggests that, even if the crawl could not be sped up into a race, state
competition is still better than the alternative.
B. Exchange Regulation
Besides corporate charters, the only area of corporate law in which
there is competition among lawmakers of any sort is exchange regulation.
The competitive regime, to be sure, is quite different: Private exchanges
rather than states compete to list individual firms' securities. 126 In contrast
to the market for corporate charters, the market for exchanges might seem
quite vibrant. Different stock exchanges use quite different methods of
trading shares-through market-makers as in the New York Stock
Exchange, or over the counter, as in the NASDAQ.127 Moreover, mergers
of exchanges, including the combination of the American Stock Exchange
and the NASDAQ, might suggest that competitive forces are successfully
at work.1 28 Comparing levels of innovation among states for corporate
charters and exchanges, however, is unfair, because the revolution in
information technology that is driving much of the innovation in
125 See William E. Kirk, 1ll, A Case Study in Legislative Opportunism. How Delaware Used
the Federal-State System to Attain Corporate Pre-eminence, 10 J. CORP. L. 233 (1984); see also Cary,
supra note 1, at 664-65. Delaware's code was modeled on New Jersey's. See Wilmington City Ry. v.
People's Ry., 47 A. 245, 251 (Del. Ch. 1900).
126 See generally Joel Seligman, The Future of the National Market System, 10 J. CORP. L.
79 (1984) (discussing exchange regulation).
127 See John F. Olson & D. Jarrett Arp, Factors a Company Should Consider in Selecting a
Market in Which to Trade Its Publicly Held Securities, SB09 ALI-ABA 101 (1996) (discussing various
exchanges).
128 See, e.g., Greg Ip & Silvia Ascarelli, Mergers of Markets May Mean Trading Will Be
Cheaper, Speedier and Easier, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1998, at Cl; Deborah Lohse, NASD and Amex
Boards Approve a Merger Agreement, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 1998, at Cl; see also Sara Calian, Market
Marriage: Nasdaq & Amex-Stock-Market Merger Talk Hits Europe, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1998, at
C13 (noting the possibility of similar combinations in Europe); Delhi, Bombay Stock Exchanges
Consider Merger, ASIA PULSE, July 9, 200l, available at 2001 WL 20128525.
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exchanges has little if any effect on optimal corporate governance
structures. 129 Indeed, the continuation of exchange systems that many
commentators view as inefficient given modern technology might suggest
that there is not enough innovation in the market for exchanges, or at least
that there are significant barriers to rapid diffusion of technological
advances. 13
The existing regulatory arrangement, in any event, is not the only
means of achieving competition for exchange regulation that we can
imagine. Instead of having private exchanges subject to the regulatory
control of the federal government, l13 one could imagine a system in which
each state may open its own exchange, subject to no interference from the
federal government. Thus, the Delaware Exchange might compete against
the New York Exchange in such a regime. Transitioning to a system of
pure state regulation, however, would probably be both quite expensive, as
it would require dismantling the private exchanges and paying just
compensation, and counterproductive, since the existence of private
exchanges probably facilitates competition. An alternative approach would
be to allow each private exchange to choose its regulator and thus operate
either within the confines of existing federal rules or under the aegis of any
state that passes an enabling statute. 133 States would thus compete to create
regulatory regimes that would attract exchanges (and, indirectly, firms)
and might retain the option of opening their own public exchanges. States
with more efficient rules would crawl to the top, as exchanges selecting
them would tend to prosper relative to other exchanges.
It might seem that given the existence of private competition among
exchanges, there should be federal deregulation and preemption of state
law. This would be a mistake, because it has potential costs and no
benefits. Exchanges, after all, must ultimately be subject to at least
contract law.' 34 Otherwise, exchanges would be able unilaterally to raise
fees that they charge firms already listed on their exchange, because there
would be no way for firms and exchanges to agree on prices in advance.
Some existing, large exchanges might not do so lest they suffer large
129 See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of
Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1985) (offering a prescient account of the effects of
information technology on securities regulation).
130 Cf Michael J. Simon & Robert L.D. Colby, The National Market System for Over-the-
Counter Stocks, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 17, 85 (1986) (noting the possible benefits of competition in
curing existing inefficiencies in exchanges).
131 The federal government regulates exchanges in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000).
132 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
133 For a recent approach along these lines, see Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara,
Regulating Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: A Law and Economics Perspective, 28 J.
LEGAL STUD. 17 (1999).
134 Even libertarians like Randy Barnett support the existence of contract law, at least when
contract interpretation is based on the principle of consent. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, A Consent
Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986).
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reputational costs, but the absence of contract law protection would almost
surely doom any exchange upstarts. Given the necessity of contract law,
we must determine which state's law should apply. With a competitive
regime, exchanges (and thus firms) would have incentives to choose states
whose contract law is most efficient, and states might even customize
generic rules of contract to facilitate efficient transactions specifically in
the exchange context. Exchanges, moreover, might want to tie their own
hands through restrictive state law provisions to enhance the credibility of
their anticipated business plans to firms.' Even if these benefits of state
law competition were absent, it comes at no cost relative to a federal
deregulatory regime. A state, after all, could decide to offer a deregulated
regime, perhaps even a deregulated regime without contract protection, to
exchanges, and thus exchanges would choose to incorporate in such a state
if that arrangement were clearly the most efficient.
State-based competition for exchanges would thus lead to two layers
of competition: one among states striving to create optimal legal rules, and
one among exchanges striving to create optimal arrangements for
trading.136 Many of the rules that exchanges currently impose on firms,
however, do not relate directly to the mechanisms by which securities are
traded. Instead, they relate to issues such as minimal financial
requirements and disclosure, 3 ' which are perhaps more properly thought
of as part of securities law. Whether exchanges would continue to offer
such rules would depend on the outcome of competition, as well as on any
changes in other areas of the law. If, for example, securities law were
selected via competition among states, as discussed immediately below,
then exchanges might find it efficient to leave disclosure requirements and
the like to the separate securities law competition.
135 See generally Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, I J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 5 (1985) (discussing "hand-tying"); Henry Hansmann & Reinier H. Kraakman, Hands-Tying
Contracts: Book Publishing, Venture Capital Financing, and Secured Debt, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 628
(1992) (same). In the corporate charter context, Delaware effectively improves such hand-tying by
requiring a two-thirds legislative vote to change corporate law provisions. See Frank H. Easterbrook,
Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23, 33-35 (1983); Romano, supra note
83, at 265-73.
136 A single corporation might select a primary exchange as well as other exchanges on
which it agrees to allow its securities to be traded. See generally Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson,
A New Approach to the Regulation of Trading Across Securities Markets, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1411
(1996) (arguing that a securities issuer should be able to determine in which markets its securities are
traded).
137 For a useful discussion, see Jay D. Hansen, London Calling?. A Comparison of London
and U.S. Stock Exchange Listing Requirements for Foreign Equity Securities, 6 DUKE COMP. & INT'L
L.J. 197, 206-07 (1995). See also Schwartz, supra note 20, at 555.
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C. Securities Law
Securities law has been an almost exclusive province of the federal
government since the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts. 138 A proposal by
Roberta Romano, however, would change that. 139 Professor Romano,
citing the benefits of competition among states in corporate charters,
140
recommends that each firm should be allowed to choose its securities
domicile, just as firms currently choose their corporate domicile. 141 A firm
could pick the securities rules of a particular state or could select the
federal government (i.e., the Securities and Exchange Commission). 142 The
state securities regime would encompass both antifraud rules and
disclosure rules, but federal law would continue to preempt rules
governing brokers.
143
My analysis of corporate law innovation ultimately supports
Romano's proposal, albeit tentatively. A crawl to the top seems preferable
to an exclusively federal regime, especially since, as Romano argues, the
federal government may sometimes impose securities rules that are more
burdensome than necessary. 144 The crawl-to-the-top paradigm, however,
138 See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 33, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77aa (2000)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 44, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78mm (2000)).
139 See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998) [hereinafter Romano, Empowering Investors]. A related
proposal that focuses on the international context is Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable
Reciprocity. Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903
(1998). See also Stephen J. Choi, Gatekeepers and the Internet: Rethinking the Regulation of Small
Business Capital Formation, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27 (1998) (explaining how the Internet
is making it more difficult for countries to enforce mandatory securities law disclosure regimes).
Romano extended her argument to the international context and responded to various objections in
Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 387 (2001). For a response to Romano, arguing that each issuer would select a socially
suboptimal level of disclosure in a competitive regime, see Merritt B. Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate,
2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 563 (2001).
140 See Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 139, at 2383-88.
141 Other scholars have suggested that exchanges should be the locus of regulation, with
firms able to choose among exchanges. See A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors. A Proposal to
Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925 (1999).
142 See Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 139, at 2365.
143 See id. at 2369-70.
144 See id. at 2373-83. There has long been a vibrant debate in the literature about whether
securities disclosure laws are justified. Compare George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock
Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132, 144-45
(1973) (arguing that the 1934 Act did not substantially increase disclosure by firms), with Irwin Friend
& Randolph Westerfield, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: Comment, 65 AM. ECON. REV.
467 (1975), and Joel Seligman, The Historical Needfor a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9
J. CORP. L. 1 (1983). Other relevant studies, finding no increase in value following the 1933 Act for
new stock registration, are Gregg A. Jarrell, The Economic Effects ofFederal Regulation ofthe Market
for New Securities Issues, 24 J.L. & ECON. 613 (1981), and George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of
Securities Markets, 37 J. BUS. 117, 120-24 (1964). In addition to siding with those who argue the SEC
has not had a substantial effect, see Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 139 at 2373 n.37,
Romano also argues that federal antifraud laws are unlikely to give better protection than state
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suggests that Romano's proposal might not be as revolutionary as one
might initially guess. Because firms are risk-averse, many will be hesitant
to opt out of the federal securities regime, even if they believe (but are
unsure) that a state's securities rules are likely to produce higher returns.
This is particularly true given that switching out of the federal regime
might be viewed as a signal that the firm has something to hide;1 45 this
signaling effect could lead to an unraveling in which no state has an
incentive to opt out of the federal securities laws. Of course, if federal
securities laws are in fact not just suboptimal but extremely suboptimal,
then the signaling effect would likely be diminished, as security holders
would recognize the benefits of opting out. 146 Moreover, the possibility
that a vast majority of firms might stick with a federal regime might be
seen as a benefit, by ensuring a smooth transition from one regime to the
other. 1
47
The possibility that many firms might continue to subject themselves
to the federal regime even if it is suboptimal suggests, however, that it
might be advantageous not to allow the federal government as a regulatory
choice. By eliminating the Securities and Exchange Commission's
regulatory role altogether, the government would eliminate the signaling
problem; all firms would need to choose a state law regime and would thus
presumably choose the regime most likely ex ante to produce the greatest
net benefits. Such a regime might in fact be quite like the regime used by
the SEC, since states could copy those aspects of current federal practice
that they believe will allow them to attract firms.
An additional advantage of eliminating the federal government option
is that such elimination would guarantee vigorous competition among
states for securities business. Ultimately, a clear leader might emerge and
innovation would thus slow down, but in the interim, states would have
incentives to innovate boldly in hopes of winning firms' allegiance in the
early years of securities competition. Presumably, firms would be
relatively willing to change the state of their securities domicile in the first
few years of competition; because investors would recognize that
determination of the best securities domicile would take some time, a
change in securities domicile from one state to another would not have a
great signaling effect. Understanding this, states whose initial attempts at
innovation proved unproductive would be relatively willing to change
antifraud laws, see id. at 2381-83.
145 See Ayres, supra note 69, at 547-59.
146 Empirical evidence suggesting that companies would be willing to opt out of the federal
regime is that many U.S. public companies have issued securities offshore under a Regulation S
exemption from securities registration requirements. See Stephen Choi, The Unfounded Fear of
Regulation S." Empirical Evidence on Offshore Securities Offerings, 50 DUKE L.J. 663 (2000).
147 But cf Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARv. L. REV. 509
(1986) (arguing that legal transitions should be immediate).
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course and try something new. Of course, eliminating the federal
government option seems less politically feasible than creating alternative
options.
States would also be more tolerant of innovation than in the corporate
charter context because, regardless of whether the federal government
option were available, a state contemplating innovation has very little to
lose. In the corporate charter context, an innovation gone awry could cause
harm to firms incorporated locally and could cause an exodus of firms that
decide to reincorporate elsewhere, but at the beginning of competition
among states for securities regulation, states will have almost no business
at all.148 While states might already have rules governing intrastate
securities, they could easily preserve such rules and write new ones to
govern interstate securities. Creating a new securities regime is not
costless, of course; a state would need to invest some resources in drafting
rules and, perhaps, in starting up a new court. These costs, however, pale
compared to the risks that a state takes when innovating with respect to
corporate charters. Moreover, states could choose not to compete in a
securities law competition if the costs of creating a regulatory apparatus
were expected to exceed the benefits.
An interesting aspect of Romano's proposal that has potential
repercussions for other possible areas of state competition is her
suggestion that corporations be allowed to select a foreign government as
their securities regulator.1 49 This recommendation builds on the work of
Stephen Choi and Andrew Guzman, who have urged a regime of "portable
reciprocity," in which the United States would recognize the legitimacy of
the securities regulation regime of any foreign country that recognizes the
legitimacy of U.S. regulation. s° Certainly, this modification to a state
competition system cannot hurt; the only plausible grounds for not
extending competition are protectionist, and the "portable reciprocity" rule
is responsive to any such concern.'s
148 1 say "almost no" because some state securities regulation continues to exist. But cf
ROMANO, supra note 74, at 112 ("The important fact from the viewpoint of federalism is that the effect
of [state] merit regulation on corporate equity capital has become increasingly contained over time,
and it is primarily a nuisance, as the dynamic of state competition, however slowly, prods states to
discard cumbersome arrangements with dubious benefits."). See generally Mark A. Sargent, A Future
for Blue Sky Law, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 474 (1993) (exploring the possibility of a greater role for state
securities regulation); Mark A. Sargent, State Disclosure Regulation and the Allocation of Regulatory
Responsibilities, 46 MD. L. REv. 1027 (1987) (discussing the allocation of responsibility for securities
regulation between the federal government and the states).
149 See Romano, supra note 139, at 2418-27.
150 See Stephen S. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of
American Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 207, 231-33 (1996). The word "portable"
indicates that the legal regime selected need not be that of the country in which the securities are
traded.
151 For a discussion of reciprocity in the trade context, see Vincent M. Paladini, Note,
Foreign Ownership Restrictions Under Section 310(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 B.U.
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Allowing selection of an international regime would likely amount to
more than just a mechanism by which to make the proposal sensible in a
world with increasingly international capital flows. It would also be likely
to increase innovation. Because foreign countries are likely to have quite
different securities regimes from the United States or from particular
states, 52 the informational externality benefits of competition will be
greater. Moreover, the existence of very different regimes ultimately could
lead to the development of empirical data that might embolden states to
attempt reforms that otherwise might have been too radical. The greater
the differences at the beginning of a securities competition, the more
vigorous the competition to innovate that is likely to result.
D. Bankruptcy
Like securities law, bankruptcy is dominated by federal law. Though
this result historically may be a function of the Constitution's Bankruptcy
Clause,1 53 no barriers prevent Congress from exercising its bankruptcy
power by requiring firms to choose from among state systems.1 54 Under
such a system, every new corporation, public and private, would choose a
bankruptcy domicile, a state which could charge a fee for being selected.
Creditors, of course, would be aware of a firm's domicile choice and could
take it into account in lending decisions. Because creditors would be
concerned with how much they will be able to recover should a debtor
enter bankruptcy, the debtor would maximize the amount it can borrow
and minimize the interest rates that it is charged by choosing the state with
the most efficient bankruptcy system. A bankruptcy system's efficiency
depends on the optimality of decisions it makes about when a firm is in
bankruptcy,155 whether a bankrupt firm should be liquidated or reorganized
INT'L L.J. 341, 357-68 (1996).
152 For analyses of the possibility of an effectively integrated international securities market,
see David E. Van Zandt, The Regulatory and Institutional Conditions for an International Securities
Market, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 47 (1991), and Samuel Wolff, Recent Developments in International
Securities Regulation, 23 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 347 (1995). For an example of a comparative
discussion of securities law, see Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud and Insider Trading in American
Securities Regulation: Its Scope and Philosophy in a Global Marketplace, 16 HASTINGS INT'L &
CoMP. L. REv. 175 (1993).
153 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
154 See generally James Steven Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in
Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause,
96 HARv. L. REv. 973 (1983) (discussing the Clause, but without addressing the particular proposal
advanced here).
155 In general, firms enter bankruptcy voluntarily. This might suggest that too few firms are
declared bankrupt because of disincentives that prevent creditors from filing for bankruptcy on account
of firms. But see Susan Block-Lieb, Why Creditors File so Few Involuntary Petitions and Why the
Number Is Not Too Small, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 803 (1991).
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as a going concern,156 and how proceeds from bankruptcy should be
distributed. 57
Although no commentator appears to have proposed a federalist
approach to bankruptcy, 58 articles by Alan Schwartz offer analysis that
helps make clear why state competition is an attractive alternative to the
exclusive federal regime.159 Professor Schwartz argues against rules that
prevent firms from contracting around bankruptcy. His particular concern
is the choice between liquidation and reorganization. Because a firm's
owners and managers receive private benefits from choosing
reorganization instead of liquidation, they will always prefer the former.
1 60
Current bankruptcy law relies on firms to negotiate with creditors ex post
to induce firms to choose liquidation when that is optimal, but because the
firm has substantial bargaining power in such situations, the firm in
Schwartz's model can capture all of the surplus resulting from such
negotiations. 161 Anticipating this ex ante, creditors will be less willing to
finance projects than they would be if the firm always made the optimal
choice. 62  Contracts that "bribe" the firm to choose the optimal
reorganization system by allowing it to keep a portion of returns from
liquidation can improve the creditors' ex post receipts (and ex ante
willingness to lend), 163  as can contracts that condition choice of
reorganization or liquidation around some signal. 64 Firms should be able
to contract around the default bankruptcy rules, Schwartz concludes, so
156 See, e.g., William L. Cary, Liquidation of Corporations in Bankruptcy Reorganization,
60 HARV. L. REV. 173 (1996).
157 See, e.g., John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963
(1989); Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44
STAN. L. REV. 69 (1991).
158 Although scholars have not advocated a system of state competition, two articles have
advocated allowing a corporation to choose the bankruptcy system it would like to be subject to in its
corporate charter. See Robert A. Haugen & Lemma W. Senbet, Bankruptcy and Agency Costs. Their
Significance to the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure, 23 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 27
(1988); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX.
L. REV. 51 (1992). David Skeel, meanwhile, has advocated partial state regulation of bankruptcy, but
he has specified that the regulator be whatever state a corporation has chosen for its corporate charter.
See David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72
TEX. L. REV. 471, 523 (1994). While Skeel's proposal appears to represent a significant step forward,
in my view an independent state competition for bankruptcy registration would be superior. See infra
Subsection IV.A.I (discussing the benefits of delinking various areas of competition).
159 See Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J.
1807 (1998) [hereinafter Schwartz, Contract Theory Approach]; Alan Schwartz, Contracting About
Bankruptcy, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 127 (1997).
160 See Schwartz, Contract Theory Approach, supra note 159, at 1821 ("Conditional on
insolvency's having occurred, the firm's managers or owners will prefer the bankruptcy system that is
more likely to permit the firm to survive or to enable them to enjoy control privileges for a longer time
if it ultimately fails.").
161 See id. at 1824 &n.54.
162 Seeid. at 1832.
163 See id. at 1827-30.
164 See id. at 1830-31.
Vol. 20:139, 2003
Crawl to Top
that they can draft such contracts and thus increase the number of projects
that lenders will be willing to finance.
If firms should be able to contract around the default rules of the
federal bankruptcy system, perhaps they should also be allowed to choose
a bankruptcy system other than the federal system. State bankruptcy
systems would compete along a number of dimensions, including being
able to distinguish situations in which a firm should be liquidated from
those in which it can be reorganized. An assumption in Schwartz's
argument is that although it is impossible to write contracts that can
distinguish perfectly ex ante the situations in which a firm should be
reorganized from those in which it should be liquidated, the firm and its
creditors will know ex post which approach is more efficient. 165 These
assumptions are in some tension with each other; if it is easy ex post to
determine whether liquidation or reorganization is better, parties in theory
could simply write vague contracts that would let courts make the
determinations. The problems, of course, are that it is not always so
obvious which route is superior, and even if it were, courts might
sometimes make a suboptimal choice ex post. Some judges and courts,
however, might acquire reputations for making better ex post
determinations than others. 66 If this is so, a state could compete by
crafting a legal regime that chooses between liquidation and reorganization
not through a complex series of rules, but by allowing considerable
discretion to courts. If ex post choice really is more efficient than
following ex ante rules, states that establish knowledgeable, reliable courts
will defeat states that rely on bright-line ex ante rules in regulatory
competition.
State competition for bankruptcy systems would differ from state
competition for charters and securities law in a significant way. With
competition for corporate charters and securities law, the purpose of the
legal regime is solely to protect a firm's owners, who ultimately make the
domicile choice. In bankruptcy, the legal regime is designed ultimately for
the benefit of creditors, but it is the firm's owners who select the domicile.
Because the firm's owners will want to make a bankruptcy domicile
choice that will be attractive to creditors, however, this distinction does not
mean that bankruptcy competition would be a race for the bottom. An
165 See id. at 1823 ("[P]arties know after insolvency which of the two bankruptcy systems
would maximize monetary returns. As in the illustrations above, however, the ex post circumstances
and their relation to what an optimal bankruptcy choice would be are too costly to describe in a
contract.").
166 Indeed, in the corporate charter context, some scholars believe that Delaware is
successful not because of its rules, but because its judges, irrespective of the rules, can be expected to
manipulate the law ex post in a consistently efficient manner. See. e.g., Douglas M. Branson,
Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 VAND. L.
REv. 85 (1990).
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important consequence, however, is that, in contrast to corporate charter
and securities law competition, a firm cannot have unilateral, unfettered
power to change its bankruptcy domicile choice. Otherwise, firms would
change to the least creditor-friendly states just before bankruptcy.
One solution to this problem might be to allow firms and creditors to
write contracts that prevent or condition changes in bankruptcy domicile.
There is, however, an alternative solution more consonant with the
philosophy of this Article: A firm's bankruptcy domicile could be allowed
to craft rules determining when a firm could change bankruptcy domicile.
A limitation of this approach is that states might have incentives to prevent
firms from switching to an alternative bankruptcy domicile. If a state
prevented efficient switches to another state's domicile, however, firms ex
ante would be hesitant to choose the state, and so there is some constraint
upon states' abilities to race to the bottom with respect to this aspect of
bankruptcy administration. This constraint could be strengthened by a
federal requirement that state rules about switching to alternative
domiciles be default provisions that firms may opt out of at the time they
select their bankruptcy domiciles. 167 An advantage of allowing state
competition for rules about changing bankruptcy domicile is that firms
may have different needs at different points in their life cycles. Thus, some
states might seek to attract relatively young firms with both bankruptcy
rules that will be efficient should those firms go bankrupt and with rules
that allow the firms to change bankruptcy domicile efficiently when they
mature. Other states, in turn, would seek to offer bankruptcy rules
appealing primarily to mature, large firms. 6
Competition for bankruptcy systems is likely to lead to a relatively
great amount of innovation relative to competition for corporate charters
and probably relative to competition for securities law as well. The reason
is that there are many, widely varying proposals for reorganizing
bankruptcy law in the academic literature, from market-based proposals
169
to those emphasizing more modest bankruptcy reforms.170 A problem with
a federal bankruptcy system is that it makes experimentation with
alternative systems difficult, if not impossible. Though allowing
contracting around bankruptcy by individual firms might alleviate this
167 Such a rule would be a mandatory rule that requires other rules to be default rules. See
generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the
Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1618 (1989) (discussing mandatory and default rules).
168 But see ROMANO, supra note 74, at 45 ("Competing state codes are not, however,
necessary to sort firms by size, because a single state can offer separate codes for differently sized
firms.").
169 E.g., Barry E. Adler & Ian Ayres, A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing Corporations in
Bankruptcy, Ill YALE L.J. 83 (2001).
170 For an interesting assessment of why the current debate is at an impasse, see Douglas G.
Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573 (1998).
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greater innovation is of no more moment than the observation that it might
be nice if the stock market were higher than it is.
A. Controlling Competition
1. Increasing Areas of Competition
Part II of this Article enumerated various areas of possible
competition in corporate law. It did not, however, specify whether a
corporation choosing among states would need to pick the same state in
various areas. Must a state's securities domicile, for example, be the same
as its corporate charter domicile? The answer is that a corporation should
not be forced to use the same state for each area of corporate law for three
reasons. 17 First, if one state has the best securities regulatory regime and
another state has the best corporate charter regime, then forcing a
corporation to choose just one state for both securities and charter
regulation would mean that the corporation would be unable to attain the
best of both worlds.
Second, competition among states to improve their laws is likely to be
more robust the narrower the area. Even if a state like Delaware were an
overall leader, some other states might be close behind in some areas,
forcing Delaware to innovate to improve its law in those areas. And
trailing states have more incentive to innovate because they have a better
chance of catching a leading state in a narrow area than in corporate law
altogether.
Third, if there are synergies in a state's offerings of two different
types of corporate law regimes, corporations have every incentive to pick a
single state to control both areas. 172 A state could even offer discounts to
corporations choosing the state for more than one area of regulation if it
cost the state less to administer laws to a single firm in two different areas
than to two different firms. Thus, the prospect that synergies might exist
does not justify forcing corporations to choose a single state for various
separable areas of corporate law.
The possibility of increasing areas of competition, however, need not
apply only across areas of corporate law regulation. It might be possible to
split individual areas into multiple areas. For example, there is no inherent
reason that a corporation needs to select a single state to run all of its
171 Professor Romano reaches the same conclusion. See Romano, Empowering Investors,
supra note 139, at 2408-10.
172 See id. at 2410 ("[T]he choice-of-law-clause approach obviates the need to guess whether
the potential synergies of one regime for corporate and securities law are substantial-market
participants' domicile choices would provide the information.").
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problem, competition among states would likely lead to instantiation of a
number of alternative bankruptcy regimes, at least initially, and ultimately
might allow for empirical work clarifying the benefits and costs of
different systems.
IV. Speeding up the Crawls to the Top
So far, this Article has offered an unusual blend. of pessimism and
optimism about state competition in corporate law. It has challenged legal
scholarship's general assumption that as long as corporate law is moving
towards an ideal, that is good enough. At the same time, it has suggested
expanding competition beyond the area of corporate charters, justifying
these recommendations with the maxim that a little competition is likely to
be better than none at all. This Part seeks to reconcile the Article's
pessimism about innovation and optimism about competition. It does so by
discussing some mechanisms that might help stimulate innovation in a
framework of competition. The mechanism that shows the most promise is
a form of intellectual property protection for corporate law innovations,
both because such protection would provide the best fit with the problem
and because existing patent laws may allow for at least a crude form of
protection for such innovations.
I do not, however, intend to project optimism about the likelihood that
any, let alone all, of these proposals would be adopted in the near future, at
least in the ideal form that I might imagine them. Despite the trend in the
literature toward embracing regulatory competition, I am skeptical that we
will see any deliberate move by the United States in that direction in the
next decade or two, for the same reasons that I have argued that
governments will usually not undertake sudden dramatic reforms even
when those reforms are expected to produce good results. At most, we can
hope that some form of intellectual property protection might evolve, and
that this form might serve as a springboard some years down the line to a
stronger form or to some existing institution. This conservativeness is
probably appropriate, because while each of the proposals is designed to
foster competition, each would represent a considerable change in the
federal legal environment; and given epistemic uncertainties about how
effective regulatory competition would be, immediate adoption of any
radical approach would be inappropriate. My project is thus admittedly
primarily conceptual, and the proposals that follow are simple sketches of
solutions. Yet if this Article's philosophy reflects one principle, it is that
the absence of innovation in corporate law should not be accepted as an
inevitable and unproblematic fixture of legal systems. Canvassing of
conceivable remedies is a necessary part of the project, for unless there are
at least potential solutions, then identification of the mere possibility of
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internal affairs. An alternative might be to allow a corporation to choose
one state's law to govern the selection of a board of directors, another
state's law to govern takeovers, a third state's law to govern derivative
suits, and so on. An advantage of splitting up different areas of corporate
law this way is that it could thwart a special interest group that seeks to
obtain inefficient rules in a particular area of corporate law.
An important objection to splitting up corporate law is that it may be
interdependent. I am skeptical that corporate law is inherently
interdependent; there is no reason that a state could not develop a takeover
code that would be sufficiently nuanced to accommodate various other
states' corporate law structures. In any event, if interdependence exists
within an area of law, corporations likely would pick one state for all
areas, just as across areas of competition, so competition could do little
harm. For many corporations, it may not even be worthwhile to research
different states' regimes, just as many corporations probably choose
Delaware law without any conscious consideration, but there may be other
firms that would choose multiple states' laws. Moreover, even if there is
overlap between some of the various areas of corporate law, choice-of-law
rules could develop clarifying which state's law and courts would govern
which legal questions. Indeed, one might even imagine states competing
for firms to choose them as their corporate charter choice-of-law domicile.
If it turns out that this apparatus has costs exceeding benefits, then firms
will have incentives to choose the same state to administer all of these
areas.
It might similarly be possible to split up securities competition.
Although Professor Romano notes that a firm should not be required to
choose its incorporation state as its securities domicile, she does not take
her argument to its logical conclusion: that a firm should not be required to
choose a single regulator for all areas of securities law. In particular,
securities law, as Romano recognizes, consists of two relatively discrete
areas: disclosure regulation and fraud suits. 73 Of course, fraud suits might
sometimes turn in part on a firm's disclosure requirements, but it is
conceivable that state law could take this into account.
-Bankruptcy law could also be split into different components. For
example, one state's law might govern the question of when a firm enters
bankruptcy, while another state's law might govern the question of
whether to liquidate a firm that has entered bankruptcy. In addition, states
might compete to govern the question of when a firm may change its
bankruptcy domicile. Thus, for example, a firm might choose California
law to determine at a later date whether it could change its bankruptcy
domicile from Delaware to New York. Of course, a state offering rules
173 Seeid. at2361.
Yale Journal on Regulation
about changing bankruptcy domicile might customize its rules depending
on the particular area of bankruptcy for which a state wished to change its
domicile.
In contract and commercial law, as well as in other areas of
competition, one might imagine separating a state's provision of a forum
in which to settle disputes from its provision of the governing substantive
law. Thus, a firm might choose New York corporate law but a Delaware
forum to interpret that law, and it would then be required to pay some
amount in fees to both. Of course, there are large synergies between
creating law and interpreting it. Delaware's Chancery Court, for example,
obviously has special expertise in Delaware corporate law. 74 But it is
possible that one state might develop expertise in analyzing another state's
law, or that some state might simply provide efficient interpretation of law
generally.
75
My sketch of how various areas of state competition might be
subdivided is of course quite tentative. The ultimate question is whether
the division among areas would need to be established in advance. On this
question, I do not have a firm answer. The advantage of letting states
determine how to carve up particular areas of law is that this would create
competition not just in individual areas but in the question of how to
divide up those areas. If the federal government dictated how states should
divide some area of corporate law, it might not perform the task optimally.
Dividing an area into too few sub-areas of competition would impede
vigorous competition; dividing an area into too many sub-areas might
impose unnecessary administrative costs on firms, states, and investors.
There are, however, two disadvantages to allowing states to carve up
competition themselves. First, because different states might divide up
areas of law differently, litigation might result to determine which state's
law governed a particular dispute. Of course, this may merely militate in
favor of a particular firm choosing states that have subdivided competition
in the same way, but states might have difficulty coordinating their
regimes. Second, a state might try to use its lead in one area to dominate
another area by requiring a firm to choose all or nothing. Of course, a firm
might choose nothing; so a leading state would be less able to allow one
sub-area of law to lag behind than it could without subdividing
competition at all. But a leading state might seek to use its market power
in one area of law to gain market power in another area.
76
174 Perhaps as a result, most Delaware corporations are sued in Delaware. See ROMANO,
supra note 74, at 41.
175 See supra note 166.
176 See generally Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis After
Kodak, 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43 (1993) (discussing tying in antitrust law); Thomas G. Krattenmaker
et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241 (1987) (same).
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These two problems in combination are probably sufficient to make
spontaneous evolution of corporate charter regulation unlikely. While it is
plausible that some state might seek to develop expertise in one sub-area
of corporate law and attract state charter business, Delaware courts could
be expected not to recognize other states' authority to control Delaware
companies, even where those companies have sought to opt-out of a
portion of Delaware law by signing up with another jurisdiction. If the
Delaware courts did not do so, they could expect to receive competition in
so many areas that Delaware would soon lose its distinctiveness. And
without Delaware's cooperation, any natural tendency for corporate law
competition to become more refined is probably doomed. This provides a
justification for intervention by the federal government, which might seek
to prevent a state from forcing firms to choose all of corporate law or from
granting excessively large discounts to firms that choose a single state for
multiple competitive areas. But federal involvement would raise many
thorny questions, and the notion that the feds could supervise competition
in corporate law without displacing it may well be fantasy. In any event,
federal involvement is not likely anytime soon, and so, for now, more
nuanced competition for corporate charter business, let alone division of
other areas in which competition has not yet been created, must remain a
topic of and for academic discussion.
2. Allowing for Private Provision of Law
Increasing the number of areas in which states may compete
effectively increases the number of markets in which competition occurs,
but not the number of competitors within any one market. Still, nothing
about states makes them exclusively suitable providers of substantive law
and interpretations. Indeed, Professor Romano specifically allows for a
firm to choose federal law, District of Columbia law, or the law of a
foreign country in the area of securities. 177 If a firm can choose the law of
any sovereign, perhaps it should also be allowed to choose the law of any
entity whatsoever. In other words, there is no justification for preventing
corporations from competing with states and other governments to become
a firm's domicile in some area of corporate law.
Allowing private companies to develop law would improve
competition in two primary ways. First, it would increase the sheer number
of competitors. The more competitors, the greater the pressure on the
leader to innovate. In addition, more competitors means a greater possible
variety of corporate law structures from which firms can choose. This
means that a firm is more likely to be able to find a corporate law regime
177 See supra notes 149-152 and accompanying text.
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particularly suited to it. Moreover, it means greater positive informational
externality benefits, since more innovations will be attempted, and greater
portfolio diversification for security holders.
Second, private firms may have greater incentives to innovate than
states. Private firms providing legal regimes may be less risk averse than
states because entrepreneurs and venture capitalists may be willing to fund
projects that have a large percentage chance of failure but a small
percentage chance of great success. States may be hesitant to innovate for
fear of adversely affecting firms that have already incorporated with
them,"78 but new private providers of law would face no such risk.
This does not necessarily mean, of course, that private firms would
necessarily do better than states in offering appealing regimes to
corporations. The existence of political pressure on states and the difficulty
of changing state law may provide a guarantee of stability from state
regulation that private providers of law cannot match. 79 Even if this is
true, however, allowing private provision of law would do no harm; the
worst case scenario is that it would not succeed. And one might imagine
that private providers of law could find other ways of assuring firms of
stability. One means of providing such stability might be to enter into
contracts with firms that could be enforced against the private legal
provider in a state court. In any regime of private competition, however, it
would be necessary to ensure that a private firm does not free-ride off a
state's provision of a forum to resolve disputes. A state could ensure this
by charging fees to a private provider of law for any disputes in its courts.
A system of private provision of law could arise in either of two
ways. First, the federal government might specifically allow firms to
compete with states in some areas of corporate law competition. For
example, if the federal government were to create a regime of securities
competition, it might provide that publicly traded corporations choosing
their security domiciles could choose private providers of law. The federal
law might either contain special provisions for what law governs should a
private provider of law go bankrupt, or it might simply leave firms and
private providers to resolve such issues themselves by contract.
Second, a state might specifically authorize private firms to provide
law under the state aegis. Indeed, there does not appear to be any reason
that this could not happen today in competition for corporate charters. For
example, Nevada could license private providers of law, and any firm
incorporating in Nevada could either choose Nevada law entirely or
choose a licensed private provider of law. The firm would then pay to the
private provider whatever fee the provider specified, as well as some fee to
178 See supra Section .C.
179 See supra note 135 (discussing the perceived benefits of the stability of Delaware law).
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Nevada itself. In essence, a state would be delegating part of its lawmaking
duties to private firms, but only with the permission of the regulated. "0
The advent of private provision of law through any means seems
particularly unlikely, however, in the wake of the recent accounting
scandals. The pressure is for more governmental involvement, not less,
and the possibility that corporations might be regulated by other
corporations would thus seem quite unattractive, especially since much of
the blame for the recent problems is appropriately on accounting firms. My
concession on this point, however, should not be confused with an
admission that the accounting scandals undermine the substantive merits
of the proposal. After all, the scandals occurred despite the existence of
uniform federal securities laws. And while the existence of misleading
disclosures undoubtedly will prompt tightening of disclosure loopholes,
the scandals furnish no reason to believe that the SEC is better positioned
than the private sector to develop rules that will inspire investor
confidence. Corporations have ample incentive to assure investors that
their disclosures are accurate, and private regulators are more likely than
public regulators to suffer from a failure to provide such confidence.
Andersen may have profited for awhile from its lax accounting standards,
but now that the failure is evident, the market has severely punished
Andersen. The SEC is stronger than ever. Any federal agency monitoring
disclosure lacks profit incentives to prevent exploitation of existing rules
in novel business environments, and when loopholes inevitably arise,
private regulators who face the danger of implosion should investors lose
confidence in their monitoring will be better motivated than public
agencies to stomp them out.'18
3. Imposing Caps on Firms per State
A simple solution to insufficient competition among states might be
to limit the number of firms that any one state can serve. The purpose of
such a proposal would be to prevent the emergence of a single leading
state and thus spur more innovation by states seeking to be among the
leaders. A federal policy to this effect might require a state above the cap
to raise the fees it charges to corporations gradually until enough
180 A state legislature's ability to do this would depend on the particular state's constitutional
limits on delegation of authority. For a survey of state delegation law, see Gary J. Greco, Standards or
Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation Doctrine in the States, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 567 (1994).
181 A full exploration of the accounting scandals' implications for corporate governance is
beyond the scope of this Article. For an excellent treatment, concluding that the costs of new
regulations may exceed the benefits while arguing that gatekeepers like auditors should be held to high
standards, see William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TULANE L.
REv. 1275 (2002). See also Margaret M. Blair, Post-Enron Reflections on Comparative Corporate
Governance (Georgetown Law & Econ. Res. Paper No. 316663, June 6, 2002) (discussing lessons to
be drawn from the Enron scandal).
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corporations felt the pinch and reincorporated in another state. For
example, in corporate charter competition, Delaware would be required to
raise its fees until some number of firms sought to leave Delaware for
other states. Other states desiring Delaware's lost business would seek to
improve their corporate law services. Today, states might not have
adequate incentives to improve their corporate law to the Delaware level
of quality, because firms have little reason to leave Delaware; but if firms
were forced to leave, then other states might have a better chance of
attracting these firms and thus try harder.
Of course, if other states merely attempted to duplicate the corporate
law structures of the leading state, the cap would not immediately spur
innovation. A cap would, however, give states the chance to prove that
they had established rules as good (or almost as good) as the leading state.
Eventually, several competitive leading states might emerge as equals to
the original leading state. At that time, one or more of these states would
have incentives to innovate boldly in an effort to become the leading state.
The cap would thus need to be set high enough so that there would still be
an incentive to become the leading state, but low enough so that other
states would initially have the opportunity to even themselves out with the
leading state. Perhaps the best policy would be to have a temporary cap,
which would.be removed once a number of states became effectively equal
competitors.
A problem with caps is that they might help to stimulate competition
only when there is a leading state but would inhibit competition when
there are several equal states. In addition, if the government passed a law
that would dynamically impose and remove caps depending on the number
of firms registering in each state, the caps might be ineffective, because
there would not be as great an incentive to become a leading state. On the
other hand, even if a state knew that its emergence as a leading state would
lead to a cap, it might still have adequate incentives to become a leading
state, because being the leader might generate a considerable profit in the
time it took for other states to catch up as the cap was imposed. Ultimately,
it might be too late to impose a cap in corporate charter competition, as
firms and Delaware would claim unfair surprise, even if it were plausible
that a federal statute creating a cap, as well as possibly an agency to
administer it, were politically feasible. Moreover, imposition of such a cap
might be counterproductive, as it might lead some firms to incorporate
blindly in their home states, thus reducing whatever impetus to the top that
Delaware produces. But if some new area of competition were created, a
cap might be a useful way of ensuring that no single state emerged as a
permanent leader. The cap, however, would have to be designed not to go





1. Paying Out Direct Federal Subsidies
The proposals that we have considered focus on the supply side by
seeking to invigorate competition among providers of law. Let us now
consider demand-side proposals that seek to reward firms or states for
innovating in corporate law. In Part I, we saw that innovation produced
benefits that firms and states did not have an adequate incentive to take
into account when formulating corporate law. Rewarding firms and states
that innovate responds particularly to the informational externality
problem. It also responds, however, to the fact that managers may not care
sufficiently about portfolio diversification benefits to shareholders; if a
firm actually receives funds for innovating, managers may find it more
difficult to resist shareholders' preference for innovation.
Perhaps the simplest way to reward innovation would be to establish a
federal agency that would simply make cash payments to firms attempting
particularly innovative corporate law structures or to states attempting
useful innovations. Focusing on firms is probably preferable to focusing
on states, however, for two reasons. First, it would require less money to
induce a single firm to innovate than to induce a state. On the other hand, a
firm can only innovate to the extent that the state it has selected uses
default rather than mandatory rules in the relevant area of corporate law.
Second, giving direct payments to states would be likely to politicize the
process more than giving payments to firms. A federal agency encouraging
corporate law innovation could work effectively only if it were relatively
insulated from political pressures.
The prospect of a federal agency rewarding firms for innovation may
sound bizarre, but it would not be so different from other agencies that
reward firms for various types of supposedly desirable activities. 182 Nor is
it different in principle from federal agencies that encourage scientific
experimentation.183 An alternative, though, that might seem less unusual
might be to accomplish the same goal though a federal agency that
competes with states for firms in a particular area of corporate law. For
example, if a regime of securities competition were established, one reason
to keep the SEC is that the SEC might be able to encourage innovation
182 See, e.g., Editorial, Cleaning Up Commerce, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1997, at A30 (noting
the Commerce Department's use of taxpayer dollars to subsidize advertising and sales of American
products abroad). While some federal subsidies may be wasteful, use of federal money to encourage
activities providing positive externalities would not be, at least in theory.
183 In 1990, for example, federal spending constituted 45% of health-related research and
development. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, PHARMACEUTICAL R&D
COSTS, RISKS & REWARDS 203 (1993).
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more than the states. Presumably, the SEC would be more willing than the
states to encourage innovation; because its constituency is national, it
would effectively internalize the informational benefits of any innovations
with which it experiments. Whether or not the SEC (or other federal
agency in some other area of corporate law competition) were to pay firms
to innovate, it could subsidize innovation by lowering fees for firms that
agree to take part in experiments with new corporate law structures.
In theory, a federal agency could provide enough money that firms or
states would internalize entirely the benefits of their innovations. In
practice, though, I suspect that the relevant dollar amounts that the agency
would need to provide to reach this goal would be so high as to be
politically impractical. After all, to induce a Fortune 500 company to
indulge a risky innovation would probably require a great deal of federal
money. This does not, however, mean that pursuing innovation is not
worth it; to the contrary, it merely emphasizes that firms have great
incentives not to innovate. A small federal agency, in any case, might still
do some good. It could focus on relatively small companies initially and
then use the results of successful experiments to induce progressively
larger companies to try specified innovations. Of course, once an
innovation proved itself, the federal agency would not need to pay
companies to adopt it at all.
2. Holding Public Good Auctions
The problem of providing direct subsidies to corporations for
innovations is that the government must determine whether the benefits of
an innovation exceed the amount of money that it would have to pay a
state or firm to implement the innovation. If the government had some
mechanism of determining how much shareholders would value a
corporation's innovation, then it would be able to offer a corporation up to
that amount for innovating. One such mechanism, famous in the public
choice literature, is that of demand-revealing preferences.1
84
In a demand-revealing preferences scheme for corporate law
innovation, any corporation could propose an innovation. After a
corporation made a proposal, other entities would inform the government
how much they would be willing to pay to the government for that
corporation to perform the innovation. For example, if a large company
offered to innovate, by having a board of directors consisting of just three
directors, other companies that might be interested in determining the
results of this innovation would inform the government of the
184 See generally T. Nicolaus Tideman & Gordon Tullock, A New and Superior Process for





informational benefit of this scheme to them. At the same time, the
company offering to innovate would indicate how much the government
would need to pay it to go through with the innovation.
The government would fund the innovation at the requested price if
and only if other companies' bids indicating their willingness to pay for
the innovation exceeded the requested price. The incentive that an entity
would have to give an honest valuation is that the entity would need to pay
the amount it specified if that amount were needed for the sum of
valuations to exceed the requested amount. Thus, if ten entities indicated
that they would be willing to pay $100,000 for an innovation, an eleventh
entity specified a willingness to pay $500,000, and the corporation
demanded payment of $1,300,000, then the eleventh entity would be
required to pay $300,000.185
While a system of demand-revealing preferences eliminates any
incentive that entities have to lie about how valuable innovations would be
to them, it has two significant weaknesses. First, the funding for the
innovations would still need to come largely from the federal government.
Theorists have shown that a system of demand-revealing preferences
cannot both collect the amount of money needed to fund projects and
induce honest valuations. 186 Second, small players would not have an
incentive to indicate the value of innovations to them, because the research
cost of determining how to value innovations might exceed the marginal
benefit of bidding. 87 Because an entity's valuation matters only if that
valuation takes the total over the top, a corporation benefits from bidding
only when its valuation does in fact take the total over the top and only to
the extent that the corporation still receives some surplus. Nonetheless, one
might imagine that very large corporations might bid when innovations are
of particular interest to them. Perhaps more importantly, very large
institutional shareholders, who would gain both the portfolio
diversification and informational externality benefits from innovation,
might still have incentives to announce valuations. The government might
use these valuations to extrapolate what smaller institutional shareholders
would have bid and use these numbers to determine whether to fund a
project.
185 For useful examples that explain why bidders will give honest valuations, see DENNIS C.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11124-25 (1989).
186 See, e.g., Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Experimental Law and Economics:
An Introduction, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 1016 (1985).
187 See MUELLER, supra note 185, at 132 ("To the extent that the size of the incentive tax
levied on any individual falls as the number of voters increases, the incentive to provide information
conscientiously dwindles.").
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C. The Intellectual Property Alternative
Outside of corporate law, a more traditional means of encouraging
innovation is to grant intellectual property protection. The next Subsection
describes what a sui generis intellectual property regime for corporate law
might look like and identifies the advantages of such an approach relative
to other means of encouraging corporate law innovation. The subsequent
Subsection explains how the existing patent law regime might provide a
foundation for such a regime, though it would deviate from the ideal
hypothetical regime in several respects.
1. The Case for an Intellectual Property Regime
While intellectual property scholars have noted that a "prize" system
might be a viable alternative to patent protection,1 88 the latter is currently
dominant in encouraging research and development of innovative ideas. If
the federal government were to give a state some form of intellectual
property protection for its corporate law innovations, it would increase the
incentives to produce such innovations. Because an innovating state would
realize that no competitor would be able simply to copy its innovations,
the state would be able more or less to internalize the informational
benefits of innovation. A state that successfully innovated not only would
be uniquely positioned to attract firms to it but would also be able to
license its innovation to other states until the intellectual property
protection expired. 89 A state thus might even attempt some innovation not
likely to have greater benefits than costs. If it turned out that the
innovation were beneficial, the state not only would capture the benefit for
existing firms in the state but also could derive revenues from firms
switching to the state or from other states deciding to license the
innovation.
An intellectual property regime would thus be particularly responsive
to one of the reasons that states might not innovate enough,' 90 that the
informational benefits of a state's innovations are largely externalized. It is
not directly responsive to the other problems, that mandatory terms may
deter new firms, that the innovation may adversely affect firms that have
already incorporated in the state, that states may be risk-averse, and that a
state may have a relatively short time horizon. The potential revenue from
licensing the intellectual property protection, however, could be sufficient
188 See Lichtman, supra note 33, at 704 n.36 (discussing the possibility of a prize system).
189 It might be desirable to mandate licensing in certain situations. See Note, Limiting the
Anticompetitive Prerogative of Patent Owners: Predatory Standards in Patent Licensing, 92 YALE L.J.
831 (1983).
190 See supra Section I.C.
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to overcome these obstacles. If not sufficient by itself, intellectual property
protection might facilitate government subsidization, eliminating the need
to have government make decisions about which innovations are
worthwhile. For example, the federal government could agree to pay some
amount of money for each dollar in licensing revenues that a state received
from other states or firms.
Such subsidization would help to overcome corporate inertia. In the
absence of significant innovations, corporations ordinarily will be reluctant
to reincorporate, and therefore there will be little pressure on states to
change their corporate laws. While newly incorporated companies are a
potential source of business, they are not necessarily a sufficiently large
source of business to encourage bold innovation. If, however, the federal
government subsidizes innovation, then it may become worthwhile for
supplier states to seek even relatively small licensing deals with other
states. The adoption of innovations by a small number of such states,
meanwhile, may increase the demand by other states for the innovation,
since what matters in the corporate law market, like all markets in which
all consumers will necessarily make purchases, is relative attractiveness.
Intellectual property protection by itself might be sufficient to induce bold
experiments that have the potential for large revenues, but subsidies might
also encourage smaller experiments. These experiments otherwise might
be too minor to be of interest to states, since the costs of reincorporation
might swamp the benefits, even though their impact on shareholder wealth
could be considerable by virtue of benefits to corporations that would not
change anyway.
If intellectual property protection were granted to corporate law
innovations, for charters or in some new area of competition, some variant
on patent protection would be vastly superior to copyright protection.' 91
Patent law protects ideas. It does, however, generally require that to
enforce a patent the licensor reduce the invention to practice. 92 This
requirement would certainly be appropriate in the context of corporate law
intellectual property protection. After all, the concern motivating this
Article is that states and firms will not experiment with corporate law
structures, even when they have ideas with positive expected benefits.
Thus, by requiring states to implement an innovation before allowing them
191 Copyright, after all, does not protect ideas but only their specific implementation. See 17
U.S.C. § 102(b). Thus, copyright protection would mean that one state could copy another's
innovations as long as it worded its statute differently.
192 See, e.g., Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (exploring the reduction-to-
practice requirement). An important qualification, however, is that a "constructive" reduction to
practice, as opposed to an "actual" reduction to practice, will suffice for a patent application, though
not for patent enforcement. See, e.g., The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1,535, 572-73 (1888) (upholding
Alexander Graham Bell's patent application, even though he had not completed manufacture of a
telephone at the time he filed for a patent).
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to enforce a patent, the intellectual property regime would ensure not just
development of ideas but also experimentation.
The same logic suggests that originality need not be a prerequisite for
this form of intellectual property protection. Even if a proposal for
innovation has been around for decades, clearly identified in the prior art,
states and firms might fail to implement the proposal because they cannot
internalize the benefits of doing so. Limiting intellectual property
protection in the corporate law context to new ideas would prevent the
system from encouraging exploitation of ideas that otherwise would sit
dormant. Indeed, paradoxically, an innovation long proposed but never
tried should be a stronger candidate for intellectual property protection in
this regime than an innovation never before proposed. Intellectual property
regimes ideally should focus on encouraging whatever is in short supply or
is otherwise deemed socially desirable. 193 The problems identified in this
Article suggest that a system of intellectual property protection for
corporate law ideally should focus on providing incentives to experiment,
and limiting the system to new ideas for corporate law innovation would
frustrate full achievement of this goal.
This does not mean, however, that originality should be entirely
irrelevant to a determination of whether a particular corporate law
innovation should receive protection. Although there are individuals who
have incentives to develop ideas for innovation in corporate law, for
example law professors and officials of states seeking to improve their
standing in a regulatory competition race, there might still be room for
others to develop additional innovations. An intellectual property system
for corporate innovation conceivably could yield more reform proposals,
or more fully developed reform proposals, than we currently have. The
nonobviousness of a corporate law innovation might be relevant to a
determination of whether the corresponding experimentation likely would
have occurred in the absence of a system of corporate law intellectual
property protection. Ideally, the intellectual property system should not
provide protection for corporate law experiments that would have occurred
even in the absence of such protection, and nonobviousness may be one
way of narrowing down all new corporate law experiments to those that
the system should protect. 194 The standard for nonobviousness, though,
193 Copyright thus provides incentives for turning ideas and research into tangible forms of
expression; trademark encourages the development of brand identities that will help consumers make
purchasing decisions; and patent facilitates both the development and the commercialization of new
inventions. See generally F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REv. 697, 703-04 (2000) (discussing the commercialization function of patent
law).
194 Some scholars have suggested that patent law should look explicitly to whether an
invention likely would have been created in the absence of the patent system. See, e.g., Roberts v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 697 F.2d 796 (7th Cir. 1983); A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness: Invention
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should be high, so that new ideas should count only if they would not have
been expected to emerge given recent developments in corporate law and
theory.
These considerations are sufficient to provide at least a sketch of the
requirements for intellectual property protection geared specifically toward
corporate law innovations. A corporate law intellectual property system
would afford protection for the first state or firm to experiment with a
proposal that had existed for long enough that it would be unlikely to have
developed in the absence of an intellectual property system. At the same
time, a state or firm that develops a corporate law innovation so
nonobvious that it would have been unlikely even to have been thought of
in the absence of intellectual property protection also would receive
protection. Either way, the key to protection would be the conclusion that
the innovation would not have occurred but for the protection. The
existence of prior art anticipating an innovation would thus be relevant not
because it automatically would bar intellectual property protection, but
because it might be relevant as evidence of whether the protection would
have occurred in the absence of the intellectual property regime.
Perhaps the principal argument against a regime in this form is its
vagueness and its susceptibility to hindsight bias. The assessment of
whether a particular proposal would have been developed or implemented
in the absence of the effort by the specific innovator is necessarily
subjective. A state implementing an innovation would thus face not only
the risk that the innovation might fail but also the risk that the innovation
might succeed and yet be unpatentable. But adding one uncertainty to an
inherently uncertain endeavor at worst would reduce some of the benefits
of intellectual property protection, with some deciding not to go forward
with an innovation because of the possibility of nonprotection. Also,
though it is impossible to prove this empirically, assessing whether a
corporate law innovation would have occurred in the absence of protection
may not be as difficult as assessing whether some other type of innovation
would have occurred. Legal officials may be better suited institutionally to
consider how plausible a legal change would have been in the absence of a
profit motive than they are to grapple with the complex economics and
science of, say, whether anyone would have developed an innovative
medical procedure in the absence of such protection.
In addition, there is a simple institutional device that could be used to
address concern about the possibility of not receiving protection for an
innovation that a state or firm might make only because of the potential for
profit. An agency responsible for the intellectual property regime could
allow a state or firm to seek intellectual property protection in advance of
Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1989).
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actual implementation. This does not address the obverse problem-that of
a firm or state receiving intellectual property protection for an innovation
that someone else would have made anyway. One way to address this
would be to require the innovation to be published for some period before
adoption. Other firms or states would have the right to experiment with the
innovation in that time without the benefit of intellectual property
protection; and if such experimentation occurred, an inference that the
experiment would have been conducted anyway would be drawn, and no
protection would be provided to the initial applicant. This approach, of
course, ought not be required for innovations that would not have been
made only because they were nonobvious. A determination that an
innovation truly was nonobvious is less subjective than one that someone
would have dared experiment with an innovation in any event.
Intellectual property protection, of course, is not without costs. As in
markets for goods and services, the provision of a patent would give the
innovating state or firm monopoly rights for some period of time.' 95
Indeed, the costs of such monopoly rights-higher prices and a lower than
optimal quantity of the innovative good or service-have led some
intellectual property scholars to note that the case for having a patent law
is not unambiguous. 196 The deadweight costs of intellectual property
protection, however, might be smaller in the corporate law context,
because the relatively small number of players would facilitate price
discrimination by holders of rights to innovations. 197 Even if intellectual
property protection is desirable for corporate law, however, there is no
reason to assume that the 20-year monopoly period that patent law grants
would be the right length for corporate law. 198 Because the small number
of states may stunt competition for corporate law, however, the case for
patent protection in corporate law may in theory be at least as strong as the
case for protection in markets for goods and services.
Although it is difficult to make definitive comparisons between a
system of intellectual property protection and other possible approaches to
increasing innovation in corporate law that I have discussed, the
intellectual property approach would have two significant advantages.
First, the intellectual property approach would be relatively decentralized.
If the federal government were to pay out direct subsidies to states or
195 See Note, supra note 189, at 837.
196 See, e.g., Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 450, 453-57 (1969). See generally Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent
Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247 (1994) (assessing the economic justification for patent law).
197 Perfect price discrimination eliminates deadweight loss, because all consumers who value
a product at above marginal cost will be able to purchase the product at the price at which they value it.
See, e.g., WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 574
(Sth ed. 1992).
198 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
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firms, it would require an administrative apparatus to choose among
competing applications. Although existing patent regimes depend on an
office to grant a patent, such assessments are binary, not ordinarily
requiring comparison among different applications or measurements of
how much of an innovation any particular patent represents."' Similarly,
supervising public goods auctions, subdividing competition into a number
of different spheres, or imposing caps on states would all require
substantial government involvement. As F. Scott Kieff has argued,
conceivably patent law could operate entirely through a registration
system, with only minimal involvement of the executive branch. 00
Innovating states or firms that had registered a corporate law innovation
under such a system could seek to enforce the innovation by suing any
alleged infringers. Congress thus conceivably could create protection for
corporate law innovations without creating a large administrative
bureaucracy.
Second, the intellectual property approach does not require the
government to make an assessment of how large a problem slow
innovation in corporate law is or how many resources should be devoted to
encouraging greater innovation. While I have argued that states and firms
have inadequate incentive to innovate, an evaluation of how much
additional innovation would be optimal would require a detailed analysis
of various corporate law reform proposals, which may be not only beyond
the scope of this article but also beyond the institutional competence of the
federal government. For example, we can have little confidence that the
federal government would make efficient decisions about how much
money to devote to corporate law innovation or about the optimal number
of caps on firms that a state could serve. An intellectual property regime,
by contrast, requires no such decisions. If it were to turn out that there are
few innovations that would be worth trying even with intellectual property
protection, there still would be no harm in creating such a system. On the
other hand, if corporate law innovations became potentially valuable,
intellectual property protection could give states and firms incentives to
innovate beyond what any other governmental program would be likely to
encourage.
I have admittedly not specified all of the details of how an ideal
intellectual property regime would work. Although I have provided a
standard for determining whether protection would be granted, I have not
199 Patent interference proceedings are an exception, but these focus on the date of
innovation, rather than on a comparison of the quality of different proposals. See generally Charles L.
Gholz, A Critique of Recent Opinions of the Federal Circuit in Patent Interferences, 81 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 241 (1999) (discussing interference proceedings).
200 See F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of
Present Patent-Obtaining Rules (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
Yale Journal on Regulation
considered the full range of doctrinal questions about that standard. For
example, I have not considered whether an applicant would need to show
that the innovation would not have occurred by a preponderance of the
evidence or by some higher or lower standard. Similarly, I have not
explained how the administrative agency administering the system would
be structured or the extent to which the decisions of this agency could be
challenged in courts of law. I have omitted those details not because they
would be unimportant, but because this Section is admittedly a thought
experiment, and analysis of the thought experiment does not require
resolution of exactly how it would be implemented.
Could a system like the one that I have described be implemented? I
doubt it. Perhaps the most likely route to create a viable system with
incentives for private parties to innovate would be for an entrepreneurial
state allowing for private provision of law to establish intellectual
property-like rules preventing one private provider within that state from
stealing the ideas of another. This would not prevent states from copying
successful innovations by these private providers, but it would provide
such private providers with some protection vis-A-vis one another. This
protection might be enough to encourage experimentation with radical
corporate forms that states would be hesitant to create in any case. Private
providers of law might try to induce firms to accept their jurisdiction
initially by paying them. If an innovation proved successful, the private
provider would at least have a head start on states hoping to duplicate the
effort. Of course, even though this proposal would require the action of
only a single state within the existing corporate law framework, it seems
unlikely in the foreseeable future, because it would require a state to make
two radical changes, first allowing for private provision of law, and second
allowing for intellectual property protection for participants.
2. Evolution of Intellectual Property Protection from Patent Law
It is far more likely that intellectual property protection over
corporate law innovations would arise from an existing intellectual
property framework than that a government would decide to create such a
regime from whole cloth. Congress is not in the business of regularly
creating novel intellectual property regimes, and creation of a new regime
seems particularly unlikely here, given the lack of awareness of the
problem of underinnovation, as well as an absence of a single group that
would expect to benefit sufficiently from such a change to make it a
lobbying priority. It is, however, entirely plausible that intellectual
property law, and patent law in particular, could evolve to protect
corporate law innovations. Patent law has famously been described as
Vol. 20:139, 2003
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protecting "anything under the sun, '20' and so coverage of corporate law
innovations would be no more remarkable than coverage of gene
sequences, which not only might seem an odd candidate for patent
protection but also has been identified by some scholars as an area in
which protection may create more harm than benefit. °2
Indeed, the doctrinal foundations for patent protection for corporate
law innovations already exist. In State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group, Inc.,2°3 the Federal Circuit upheld the validity
of a patent detailing an algorithm for managing an investment fund
structure. Such business method patents have been controversial, °4 but the
Federal Circuit reasoned that there was no reason to exclude business
method patents from the scope of patentable subject matter if they met the
usual requirements. 0 5 The logic extends without difficulty to corporate
law innovations. If someone develops a nonobvious way to structure a
corporation, this method could receive patent protection, and the patentee
would be able to enforce the patent even against a firm competing in a
different industry. Erik Maurer has noted that lawyers might seek to patent
a variant on the poison pill antitakeover defense or perhaps an antidote to
the poison pill. 20 6 Patent coverage might enable riskier strategies as well,
including strategies that might prove ineffective because of any
uncertainty about whether they would be upheld by the courts, thus
201 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) ("Congress intended statutory subject
matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made by man."') (quoting S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5
(1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399).
202 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights
and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998);
Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science,
94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77 (1999).
203 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
204 See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 263 (2000); Jeffrey R. Kuester & Lawrence E.
Thompson, Risks Associated with Restricting Business Method and E-Commerce Patents, 17 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 657 (2001); Leo J. Raskind, The State Street Bank Decision: The Bad Business of
Unlimited Patented Protection for Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 61 (1999); Brian P. Biddinger, Note, Limiting the Business Method Patent.- A Comparison
and Proposed Alignment of European, Japanese and United States Patent Law, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
2523 (2001); Sari Gabay, Note, The Patentability of Electronic Commerce Business Systems in the
Aftermath of State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 8 J.L. & POL'Y 179
(1999); James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. 12, 2000, at 44; Nicholas
Groombridge & Christopher Loh, Congress Takes Aim at Business Method Patents, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 6,
2001, at 1.
205 "The plain and unambiguous meaning of § 101 is that any invention falling within one of
the four stated categories of statutory subject matter may be patented, provided it meets the other
requirements for patentability set forth in Title 35, i.e., those found in §§ 102, 103, and 112, 2." State
Street, 149 F.3d at 1372.
206 Erik S. Maurer, Note, An Economic Justification for a Broad Interpretation of Patentable
Subject Matter, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1057, 1080-81 (2001).
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encouraging the development of precedent and the clarification of
corporate law.
The scope of patent protection, of course, would not match the exact
scope recommended above. Old proposals would be excluded under the
nonobviousness requirement, even if no one had ever attempted to
implement them because of an inability to internalize the benefits of
experimentation with the invention. Over-inclusiveness might be a
problem too. Patents could issue for corporate law innovations that likely
would have been developed and implemented even in the absence of
intellectual property protection as a natural response to developments in
the corporate law environment. Patent protection thus might frustrate the
adoption of useful corporate law innovations. Patentees, however, would
have an incentive to license their innovations to maximize their revenues,
and a firm desiring to take advantage of a particular innovation could
always reincorporate in the innovating state. Although it is impossible to
calculate to what extent the imperfect scope of the patent system in this
context would undercut the case for a patent proposal, the benefits of
patent protection seem likely to be greater than in other fields. This Article
has shown that there are substantial obstacles to innovation in corporate
law, perhaps greater than in markets for goods and services, where
commentators have estimated that many inventions would be




Moreover, the costs of patent protection for corporate law innovations
are no greater than the costs of protection in some other areas, such as
business method patents. Indeed, there is a strong argument that business
208method patents, like unnecessary patents, entail the danger of
unnecessarily stifling innovation, because the field of business methods
features the same mismatch between the law and an ideal intellectual
property regime as I have identified for corporate law innovations. Ideas,
for the most part, are not in short supply in the business world. Everyone
and his sister have ideas about what could turn into the next Wal-Mart.
What are in short supply are entrepreneurs (and, perhaps more
significantly, financiers) willing to take a chance on a particular idea. Of
course, many do take chances by starting up innovative businesses, but it is
plausible that many potential businesses do not exist because second-
mover advantages outweigh first-mover advantages. Business method
patents provide only an imperfect answer because the validity
determination is not based on direct consideration of these relative
advantages. Thus, some business method patents offer protection where
none is needed given first-mover advantages, while the patent system may
207 See, e.g., Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI.
173 (1986).
208 See supra note 194.
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refuse protection for obvious ideas that nonetheless will not be developed
because of the dominance of second-mover advantages. Patent law does
not directly make this comparison for other subject matter either, but in
fields of endeavor like pharmaceutical drugs, there may be greater
congruence between the need for patents and the standards for issuing
them.
Of course, given the criticisms of business method patents among
commentators, the imperfection of business method patents may not seem
to make a compelling case for patents on corporate law innovations. The
mismatch, however, is likely to be of lesser concern with corporate law
innovations, because first-mover advantages are likely to be smaller for
corporate law innovations than for other business method patents. Federal
Express may have had substantial first-mover advantages by creating the
first overnight delivery service, both because it was able to establish a
brand name and because it may have been able to take advantage of
network externalities. 209 Brand name is less likely to be of concern for
corporate law innovations, for two reasons. First, states, likely to be the
primary players in innovation, may already have brand identities that any
one innovation is unlikely to change significantly. Second, because
incorporation is a significant decision, brand associations are likely to be
of less significance than they would be for relatively minor consumer
purchasers. Network externalities may be an issue in the corporate law
context, but because any innovating state will start with a fairly large base
of corporations, it may be less of one. Thus, second-mover advantages will
tend to dominate first-mover advantages, and while this raises the danger
of false negatives, it reduces the danger of false positives. A smaller
percentage of patents for corporate law innovation are thus likely to be
harmful than would be the case for business method patents.
Perhaps the most significant practical obstacle to patents for corporate
law innovations would be the constitutionality of enforcing such patents
against infringing states. There is little doubt that Congress would have
power under either the Intellectual Property Clause or the Commerce
Clause to enact such a regime. While Congress may not be able to take
advantage of its commerce power to skirt limitations imposed by the
Intellectual Property Clause,2"" if one found that the Intellectual Property
Clause were irrelevant for corporate law innovation (a result that I doubt),
there would be no obstacle to Congress's assertion of its commerce power,
209 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
210 See, e.g., Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability? The Intersection of the
Intellectual Property and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond a Critique of Shakespeare
Co. v. Silstar Corp., 18 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 259 (1995). Whether Congress could override the
requirement that copyrights be for "limited times" by use of the commerce power is at issue as an
alternative argument in the Eldred case before the Supreme Court. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372
(D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 1062 (2002).
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which clearly extends to the regulation of business activity, at least under
modern doctrine allowing such agencies as the SEC. First, given recent
interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment, states would have sovereign
immunity in suits by private parties.21 This problem is mitigated by the
fact that states can sue other states,212 but if too many such suits wind up in
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, they could undesirably drain the
scarce resource of the Supreme Court docket. Thus, the same concerns
about states violating private parties' intellectual property rights because
of sovereign immunity could appear in this context. A possible solution
here would be for the federal government itself to police violations of
states' intellectual property rights by other states, or indirectly to allow qui
tam plaintiffs to police such violations, since the federal government
clearly can bring suit against states in federal court. 13
Second, even with jurisdiction, courts might be hesitant on
substantive grounds to enjoin a state from designing its corporate law as it
chooses. One might argue that the anti-commandeering principle of New
214York v. United States would bar Congress from forcing a state
government to structure its law in any particular way.2 ' s This argument
seems like a stretch, however, for the government would not be requiring a
state to structure its law in a certain way but prohibiting a state from
committing a tort, which happens to be committed through operation of
state law. There is little doubt, after all, that a state law permitting state
agencies to copy copyrighted works without compensation would subject
the state to liability, albeit a liability that cannot be enforced for
jurisdictional reasons by the aggrieved parties.216 To be sure, a full analysis
of the anti-commandeering principle would be beyond the scope of this
Article, and the doctrine is sufficiently thin that a variety of doctrinal
outcomes are possible.
In any event, states seeking intellectual property protection might
have a workaround if the federal courts refused to allow them to sue each
other. Instead of suing other states copying their corporate law regimes,
they could sue private firms taking advantage of the corporate law
innovation. This might be easier for innovations that directly affect
211 See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S.
627(1999). This decision does not preclude suit by one state against another, which would be in the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.
212 See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981) (finding a controversy among
states justiciable where the plaintiff states claimed economic damages).
213 See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
214 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
215 For an analysis of some of the doctrinal uncertainties created by New York v. United
States, see Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz,
and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REv. 71.





individual firms than for innovations strictly internal to a state regime. For
example, if New York developed a new process for voting by corporate
boards and received a patent on such a process, it would likely be able to
enforce this patent against a New Jersey corporation infringing on that
patent, even if the corporation were simply following New Jersey law. (Of
course, a corporation that itself developed such a process also could seek
and enforce a patent against another corporation using that patent.) On the
other hand, if New York created an innovative new court for adjudicating
corporate law cases, it might have trouble suing a New Jersey corporation
after New Jersey copied its scheme. Even in such a case, however, New
York could argue that the New Jersey corporation was guilty of
contributory infringement by bringing its case in an infringing court.
217
Conclusion
Legal scholarship almost invariably takes the form of advising judges
on how they should make decisions when faced with particular questions.
A higher-order problem is to focus on the decisionmakers' incentives to
render sound legal decisions. The scholarship on competitive federalism is
one of the few areas of legal literature to take this approach. That
scholarship, however, has focused narrowly on the question of what the
ultimate outcome of competition is likely to be, without exploring the pace
at which competition is likely to proceed or institutional mechanisms that
might affect states' and firms' incentives to innovate. My aim in this
Article has not been so much to announce a solution to the question of how
best to structure competitive lawmaking in corporate law but to refocus
attention on the mechanisms of competition and to offer preliminary
proposals for addressing the problem of underinnovation. Patent law, at
least, provides a doctrinally sound basis for experimentation that might
make possible a clearer assessment of the potential value of additional
innovation and might further stimulate the conversation that in this Article
I have tried to start. Allowing states to compete in corporate law is but a
first step. The task remains of speeding up the crawl to the top.
217 For a thorough discussion of the doctrine of contributory patent infringement, see Alfred
P. Ewert & Irah H. Donner, Will the New Information Superhighway Create "Super" Problems for
Software Engineers? Contributory Infringement of Patented or Copyrighted Software-Related
Applications, 4 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 155, 161-73 (1994).

